ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF JULY WAR 2006 ON ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY: CASE STUDY

(July War 2006 Between Israel and Hezbollah)

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COMMITTEE DECISION

This Thesis (Assessing the Implications of July War 2006 on Israel,s Foreign Policy) : A Case Study (July War 2006 Between Israel and Hezbollah) was Successfully Defended and Approved on 30 March 2010

**Examination Committee**   **Signature**

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هذه النسخة من الرسالة
التوقيع.......... التاريخ....٦٠......٧/٤/٢٠١٠م

To my dear parents;

To my beloved wife, and children:

Mohammad

Haya

Mahmoud

Hana

Eman

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABSTRACT

This study aimed at highlighting the relation between military power and foreign policy, identifying the reasons that stood behind the July War 2006 and analyzing the July war's impact on Israel's foreign policy. The study adopted the analytical descriptive approach with five typical chapters: Introduction, Theoretical Framework, July War Scene, Impact on Israel's Policy and Conclusion. Regarding the first and the fifth chapters as only introducing and concluding instruments respectively, Chapter 2 discussed the concepts of and the mutual association between military power and foreign policy. Herein, both military power and foreign policy are defined and approached, with explaining certain terms such as power being hard and soft power and diplomacy being cooptive and coercive. Chapter 3 described the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah from the very beginning with describing both Hezbollah and Israel's actions against each other, along with showing the international action and reaction, until the ceasefire was announced and the various reactions whether in Lebanon, Israel or in the rest of the world are shown, and describing the impacts of the July War in general in terms of causalities, financial repercussions and media controversies. Chapter 4, which presented the impacts of the July War on Israel's

foreign policy, as Israel was defeated in the War, along with explaining various aspects such the military escalation between the two parties, Israel's mission outcomes, urgent diplomatic effort, interior conflict and direct political impacts and lastly the regional alliances which Israel enjoyed after the War. Within its hypothetical scope and in response to its questions, the study found that military power is the key instrument to achieve political ends and defend it's foreign policy, that the Israeli military and political leaderships failed in achieving their goals at the July War, which in turn led them to have some changes in their foreign policy after the War, basically toward diplomacy and 'soft power' attitudes.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Prelude

No one doubts the importance of military power and foreign policy in a state's attempt to have pleasant regional or international relationships with its neighbors or other states. This pleasance is attained only when this or that state seems to own on the one hand a menacing military power and on the other hand an affective foreign policy. As if one failed the other success or enhance the success. In fact, menacing (i.e. offense) and deterring (i.e. defense) are a state's two forward-connected pillars (Walt, 2009), so that its interior security and exterior stability are maintained. Although both terms look lexically different from or mostly opposite to each other in linguistics, they are related and mostly refer to one meaning in politics, which is an entity's status of these two above-said attributes of security and stability.

The study in it's attempt to find a definition for military power , it found that military power is the ability and capability of a state to achieve certain ends .and assume the foreign policy is defined in general as the interaction between entities economically, politically, socially and militarily.

History notes that the more menacing a state enjoys, the more deterring it can have for its entity and existence, and vice versa. The point is then an integral combination of power- and policy-like instruments; if one fails, the other(s) necessarily stops working and must be adapted in order to cope with that source failure and eventually attempts to attain a newly-drawn point of target success.

In the anarchical international system, states differ in solving their regional/international disputes and in how to protect their interests and maintain their security and stability (Quester, 2004: 81-82), especially in absence of affective coordination between their menacing and deterring wings. The absence of the procedures that are to be taken by the concerned international organizations is also a cause of global anarchy and regional mess, as no government above the world's states is capable to regulate the interactions and relations between states themselves or between states and other actors in international system.

In the international arena, a state's military power and foreign policy are two forms of capacity, which are both integral as just mentioned above, and are to be necessarily coordinated and based upon in any case of war or warlike political dispute. Military power is a state's capacity to rage wars against others, and foreign policy is its capacity to have a diplomatic activity with them (Nye, 2006; Bogdanov, 2004; Peterson, 2009; Mahabir, 2005; Welch, 2006; Wilson, 2008). No state enters a war just for war, but for imposing certain mostly-political demands on the other party of the war and when it makes sure that its military power is well-mobilized and efficiently equipped. A military failure resulted then in a state's being politically depressed and those demands' getting minimized or even cancelled, which actually proves how much military power and foreign policy are related to and connected with each other.

In case of the July War 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel had firstly certain political ends and interests mainly drawn by its foreign-policy makers and was secondly self-conceited of its military power to have those ends and interests attained

as required. The July War did not end only with urban destruction as just most wars end with, the direct most essential and turning-point-like consequence of the War is its giving more preponderance to the internal penetration theory in the formula of political conflict in the region after the failure the Israeli military bet had (Bannoura, 2008). That failure raised serious questions regarding the military capability of Israel in the future and then regarding Israel's foreign policy to dominate the region and be a US hand to reshape this region and steal up its wealth alike.

Israel since established in 1948 adopted a realistic theory in conducting its foreign policy. This theory in case of Israel seeks survival through adopting both offense and defense in protecting interests and attaining ends. The July-2006 War seized on more concern and debate than any other Arab-Israeli wars, because it did not break out directly between two states but it came between a so-called qualified, sophisticated state with its military power and foreign policy and the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon mainly represented by Hezbollah, which proved how much it was, and actually still is, there in the regional arena with its structured entity to be recognized and its obvious targets to be implemented.

1.2 Problem of the Study

Over viewing the War, the principal parties of the July-2006 War were Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israeli military (AFP, 2006; Katz, 2006). The conflict started on July 12, 2006 and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect in on August 14, 2006, though the War formally ended on September 08, 2006 when Israel lifted its naval blockade of Lebanon.

The Israeli military doctrine will be herein identified, as it maintains the Israeli security and stability in the region by its menacing and deterring deterrence military and political capabilities. It means that the security view of Israelis is based on that which was mainly planned by Bin Ghorion in terms of the necessity of following anticipatory counter attacks instead of long period wars. The defensive doctrine of Hezbollah will not be neglected on the opposite side, as there is a matter concerning the sovereignty of Lebanon. Due to the fact that Hezbollah is not a political state-like entity, its strategy is different when ones talk about issues of offense and defense. The doctrine of its resistance movement is mainly based on struggle for land and on commitment to do that job willingly.

The Israeli army was interested in strengthening its military capabilities by the pretexts of "fear" from its Arab enemies. That no friends nor allies exist in politics is Israel's priori principle in order to be always the holder of the first strike. Hezbollah's resistance on the opposite side started to grow up politically and build its military capabilities to liberate the south of Lebanon from the Israeli occupation along with any Arab lands still falling under foreign occupation. This sustainable process of development and organization enabled Hezbollah to play a significant role in the regional and domestic system. Hezbollah achieved more than one aim, most importantly its victory in the July-2006 War. This victory was not an easy end, but it shifted the military strategies of Israel and forced it to reconsider its plans and strategies toward its biggest enemy (i.e. the Arabs) on the technical trend and reshaping its foreign policy.

1.3 Significance of the Study

The significance of the present study comes mainly from its attempting to examine at some extent the final consequences of the July war (i.e. the political ends and interests) through reading up weaknesses and failing tactics of the Israeli leadership mainly in Winograd Report and in many other academic and official analyses. From this point, the impact of the July war between Hezbollah and Israel on Israel's foreign policy is insisted herein. In turn, the War's consequences helped open up indirect negotiations with Syria mediated by Turkey and interrupted after the Israeli invasion of Gaza Strip. The study will deals as well in a different manner and respect with the Palestinian issue in general and how the Israeli foreign policy is modeled.

The study will illustrate what the implications of the July war 2006 on Israel's foreign policy as a case of the relationship between military power and foreign policy, through the sequences of the July war 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah. The July-2006 War will be used herein as a case study in order to prove the hypothesis of the study, which entails generally that:

▪ military power is the key instrument to achieve political ends in the Israel's foreign policy toward Arab countries;

▪ distrust and deterrence are the most dominant factors when drawing military policies in Israel, so it seeks to sophisticate its military capabilities to face any expected military attack;

▪ the Israeli military and political leaderships failed in achieving their goals, whereas the Islamic resistance achieved its, as in cutting the arm of the Israeli deterrence policy;

▪ some changes occurred in Israel's foreign policy after the July War 2006.

The study is based as well on three main questions to be answered throughout the analysis and discussion of the July-2006 War. Such questions are as follows:

1)   What are the military strategic principles of both Hezbollah and Israel?

2)   How did the technology of Hezbollah's weapons and plans destroy the legend of the Israeli so-called 'invincible' army?

3)   What is the impact of July-2006 War on Israel's foreign policy?

The present study aims accordingly, regarding the matter of assessing the implications of the July War 2006 on Israel's foreign policy, at:

▪   highlighting the relation between military power and foreign policy;

▪   identifying the reasons that stood behind the July War 2006; and

▪   Analyzing the July war's impact on Israel's foreign policy.

1.4 Review of Related Literature

The present study attempted actually to be distinguished from any previous studies by adding a military analysis following the war events day by day of the both sides especially on 18th July after the Israeli military failure on the ground battle and try to find a diplomatic solution for the conflict and the study made a political analysis to the July War 2006 and its impact on Israel's foreign policy.

▪   Marco Vincenzino (2006) in his "the Conflict in Lebanon Part I: Inside Israel" argued that the continuity of a state of conflict in perpetuity may provide a reason for existence and guarantee the accompanying privileges and benefits of power. The

United States should use its diplomatic and economic resources more effectively throughout the region and particularly in Lebanon.

- Gary C. Gambill (2007) in his "the Implications of the Israel-Hezbollah War" discussed the background of the war; the military, strategic, diplomatic and political outcomes; and the implications of the war on both sides.

- Fern Sidman (2006) in his "the Resurgence of Orwellian Ideals" examined how much Hezbollah is well organized and a thoroughly-trained band of guerilla fighters who fight their battles while living in civilian populations and blending in with the civilian infrastructure. Since the inception of this current conflict, they have fired thousands of Katyusha rockets into Israel from civilian strongholds and neighborhoods throughout southern Lebanon and in Beirut.

- Robert G. Rabil (2008) in his "Hezbollah: Lebanon's Power Broker" examined Hezbollah from its origins as a radical sectarian group in the 1980s; it has migrated into Lebanon's political mainstream. In the process, Hezbollah has acquired the institutional trappings of a state and the capabilities of an army and discussed Hezbollah's roots and how Hezbollah operates along with des cribbing the Post-conflict crisis.

- Efraim Inbar (2007) in his "How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War" elaborated how Israel bungled the second Lebanon War and Israel's failure to deter and to prepare unrealistic goals, bungling the aftermath.

- Patrick Devenny (2006) in his "Hezbollah's Strategic Threat to Israel" talked about the potential threats faced by Israel and how Hezbollah would attack Israel along with describing Israel's credible defense and the possibility of a new conflict in the horizon?

▪ Shmuel Bar (2007) in his "Deterring Non-state Terrorist Groups: The Case of Hezbollah" argued how the Israeli policy in the months before the Second Lebanon War of 2006 did not prevent Hezbollah from taking actions that Israel considered highly unacceptable and ultimately resulted in the Israeli decision to conduct military operations against Hezbollah's power base in Lebanon. However, this does not vindicate the conventional wisdom that Israeli deterrence of Hezbollah failed in a simple, unambiguous fashion. Rather, Israeli deterrence signals were not clear and Hezbollah did not understand that it was crossing red lines that would result in Israel undertaking high-intensity military operations in Lebanon.

1.5 Methodology

In order to examine the differences between the subject variables to reach reasonable results and to check the credibility of the above-shown hypothesis, which all would help attain the subject objectives and find answers to the previous questions, the study will pursue the historical methodology in order to obtain historical background about the military doctrine of the Israeli army and Hezbollah. The second methodology is analytical, which will concern itself with examining the causes behind the unsuccessful strategies approved and carried out by the Israeli leadership and the causes behind ending the counter in favor of Hezbollah which affected then the Israeli foreign policy.

This study wills discus the roots of the conflict and concentrates on the 33 days of the war from 12 July 2006 to 14 August 2006 and the impact of the war on Israel's foreign policy. The resources used to accomplish this study were books, periodicals, magazines, websites, research papers, newspapers and articles in connection with the July War 2006.

The study will be generally and formally as well under the title (Assessing the Implications of July War 2006 on Israel's Foreign Policy) with a case of the July War 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah, including in its structure an introduction, four chapters and lastly a conclusion. Chapters 2-5, as representing the major body of the present study, will generally and respectively herein attempt to: define both military power and foreign policy along with the potential relationship between them; highlight the July War 2006's aims and events starting with a general background and ending with the War's aims and events; address the strategies and plans of the two parties of the war; and lastly identify the impact of the July War 2006 on Israel's foreign policy.

II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

In fact, there is no a clear-cut definition for either military power or foreign policy, or even the relation between them. These concepts are mostly related to social sciences, which are in turn concerned with human activities and behaviors, and can not then be applied to the empirical test as scientific sciences. Regarding military power, it generally knows as the main pillar in strategic studies that deal with military power to attain certain political ends, whether by the actual use of force or by threatening or deterring others, which reflect the themes of the Realism School. Foreign policy on the other side is known as the interaction, which concerns itself with shaping the relations between a certain state on the on hand and certain other entities on the other hand in order to achieve its national interests, regardless of what sort of power that will be used by that state toward the other entities.

In terms of the relation between military power and the foreign policy, military power is considered to be as the main instrument of foreign policy, but it is not alone sufficient to achieve a state's interests. Therefore, it is a must for this or that state to adopt an integral combination of instruments crowned by foreign policy depending on various factors such as regional stability, international circumstances and a state's needs and interests. A state sometimes finds itself obliged to sacrifice and lessen its high aspirations by giving some concessions to maintain its security and keep up its (basically at least short-run) relationships with all and any other countries and entities in order to gain more long-run ends and interests. Too many situational

requirements are to be considered in terms of the scarcity of options and the distance
of diplomatic maneuver.

Both military power and foreign policy will be discussed in details within the
forthcoming sections in terms of various criteria such as definition and development,
along with the relationship between them and how each of them affects and is affected
by the other.

2.2 Military Power

2.2.1 General Definition of Military Power

Military power is the ability and capability of a state to achieve certain ends and
interests. What 'ability' in this respect means is the actual use of force or threatening
or deterring; whereas 'capability' means the material, technological and scientific
methods of research. Ends and interests are herein used to refer particularly to the
political aims. Generally on the way to define military power, power is the ability to
affect the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants (Nye, 2006). There are
almost three basic ways to do that: you can coerce them with threats, you can induce
them with payments or you can attract and co-opt them. The concept of military
power has at all times been the focus of attention by the public, scientific and military
circles in any country of the world. A large number of publications have recently
emerged on the nature and content of military power, as well as the principal
guidelines for its modernization and development.

More specifically, military power is materialized directly in the armed forces,
yet this is an insufficient definition of military power. A state's military power is

mostly understood as an aggregate of material and productive capabilities of society's economic, intellectual and spiritual assets, its ability to mobilize and use them to prevent a war, and should this prove impossible, to refuse aggression (Bogdanov, 2004). It is also the aggregate of military, economic, and intellectual capabilities as generally defined by international scientific practical conference[1] held in March 2005 in St. Petersburg.

The military (i.e. the army) is an integral and at the same time subordinate element in the total pattern of governmental power (Louis, 1951: xv). Zolotarev (2001: 12) also gives almost the same definition of military power regarding it as an aggregate of military, economic, and intellectual capabilities, and a state's military power is an aggregate of its material, intellectual, and spiritual assets and its ability to mobilize them to achieve war objectives and is the sum total of economic, social, scientific-technical, political and military capabilities. It is the state's capability at any given moment to ensure military security as an essential component of its national security. It is then an aggregate of all material and intellectual forces and assets of a state (a coalition of states) and its ability to mobilize these forces to achieve military objectives; a materialization of a country's military, economic, scientific-technical, and moral and political capabilities.

However, military theory and practice have advanced greatly (Peterson, 2009. The content of the term 'military power' has in the past 20 years has substantially changed in the world to a very considerable degree. It has been seen above that the military power of a state is a part of its material and intellectual resources that can be

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[1] The conference was titled: the Military Establishment in Russia and the Neighboring Countries: the Past, Present, Future

used to achieve military-political objectives; an aggregate of a state's entire material and intellectual resources and its ability to mobilize these resources to achieve military objectives or to fulfill other tasks. Yet, military power today does not at all serve war objectives. It is designed to avert war. The military power of any state is not always to serve the purposes of aggression, plunder, and looting against own and foreign peoples (Peterson, 2009). In modern conditions, any country of the world does not need to use its entire military power to demonstrate its force.

Military power is not simply a mechanical mixture of possibilities and capabilities (Kroger, 2006). The definition of such basic categories should be approached with a greater sense of responsibility since they affect the lives of millions of people, and both military and national security. The doctrine of military power and capability rests on the primary notion of fear, and specifically, fear to one's life. Even preventive/defensive (i.e. preemptive) military capability, including nuclear capability, is rooted in this primary notion of fear. The world's nuclear states do not tire from claiming that their capability is only preemptive, that is to say, only conceived as a defensive measure, or as a measure to address that primary notion of fear.

For every level of fear addressed through a military strategy or state of readiness, a further threat comes to be conceived for which further military capability is sought (Kroger, 2006). Defeats are addressed through a reappraisal and refinement of the very same military doctrine that proved its failure to provide security in the first place. For any revealed failure in the security strategy, it is assumed, there must be a better strategy that could be found: hence the pursuit of the elusive answer (Kroger,

2006). Nothing can assure us that the fear thesis truly captures human nature at its pristine stage (Kroger, 2006).

Applying the military doctrine to Israel's predicament, and given a rigid definition of what being an Israeli means, the dilemma of the insatiability of fear implies an indefinite search for better security capabilities. For every security measure, there is a counter measure that breeds further insecurity (Kroger, 2006). The acquisition by Pakistan or Iran of a nuclear capability neutralizes the security achieved by Israel's own nuclear capability. Non-governmental terrorism neutralizes governmental military superiority. Chemical weapons neutralize the security of cement walls. Demography itself can come to be viewed as a threat (Kroger, 2006).

War is one of humanity's enduring pastimes. Winning at war is important, and people have put much thought into understanding how to win (Biddle, 2004: 337). National foreign policies, military structures, and military budgets are based on the calculus of victory and defeat (Biddle, 2004: 337). Whether a nation plans aggression, fears aggression, or wants the advantage of military power in nonmilitary negotiations, it must measure its military power against that of other nations and adjust accordingly (Biddle, 2004: 337).

The problem for policy makers lies in understanding that the forces needed and the casualties to be expected when facing a nation that does not use the modern system are not the same when facing a nation that does use the modern system. On the one hand, excessive expectations can lead to timidity in nonmilitary policy (Biddle, 2004: 337).

The reaction to an aggressor is as important as the aggression itself in determining whether there will be a war or not (Black, 1998: 272). Cultural factors, especially the level of bellicosity in a society, are what determine whether wars break out or are avoided (Black, 1998: 272). This bellicosity leads to war not through misunderstandings that produce inaccurate calculations of interest and response, but, rather, from an acceptance of different interests and a conviction that they can be best resolved through the use of force (Black, 1998: 240).

In terms of power projection (or say a state's capability of force projection as just used in military and political science), it is that state's capacity to conduct expeditionary warfare (Defense, 2002). It refers then the state's ability to implement policy by means of force, or the threat thereof, in an area distant from its own territory. Power projection is also the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power (i.e. political, economic, informational, or military) to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability (Defense, 2002).

This ability is a crucial element of a state's power in international relations. Any state able to direct its military forces outside the limited bounds of its territory might be said to have some level of power projection capability, but the term itself is used most frequently in reference to militaries with a worldwide reach. Even states with sizable hard power assets may only be able to exert limited regional influence so long as they lack the means of effectively projecting their power on a global scale.

Generally, only a select few states are able to overcome the logistical difficulties inherent in the deployment and direction of a modern, mechanized military force.

2.2.2 Approaches to Military Power

Hard power is a concept which is mainly used to refer to national <u>power</u> which comes from military and diplomatic means. It is used in contrast to <u>soft power</u>. While traditional measures of power projection typically focus on hard power assets (tanks, soldiers, aircraft, naval vessels, etc.), the developing theory of soft power notes that power projection does not necessarily have to involve the active use of military forces in combat (Campbell and O'Hanlon, 2006). Assets for power projection can often serve dual uses, as the deployment of various countries' militaries during the humanitarian response to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake illustrates. The ability of a state to project its forces into an area may serve as an effective diplomatic lever, influencing the decision-making process and acting as a potential deterrent on other states' behavior (Campbell and O'Hanlon, 2006; Nye, 2004).

Hard power is a term describing power obtained from the use of military and/or economic coercion to influence the behavior or interests of other political bodies. As the name would suggest, this form of political power is often aggressive, and is most effective when imposed by one political body upon another of lesser military and/or economic power (Campbell and O'Hanlon, 2006). It is a term used in international relations, and a theory that describes using military and economic means to influence the behavior or interests of other political bodies. It is used in contrast to soft power, which refers to power that comes from diplomacy, culture and history.

While the existence of hard power has a long history, the term arose when Joseph Nye (2004) coined 'soft power' as a new, and different form of power in a state's foreign policy (Nossal, 1998). Hard power is mostly placed in the international relations discipline of Realism, where military power is seen as the expression of a states' strength in the international community (Nye, 2004). Hard power lies at the command end of the spectrum of behaviors and describes a nation's ability to coerce or induce another nation to perform a course of action (Campbell and O'Hanlon, 2006). This can be done through military power which consists of coercive diplomacy, war and alliance using threats and force with the aim of coercion, deterrence and protection. Alternatively economic power can be used which relies on aid, bribes and economic sanctions in order to induce and coerce.

Hard power and soft power are vague terms in foreign and defense policy circles these days. They are heard with increasing frequency (Smith-Windsor, 2000). It seems almost impossible to discuss the current and future state of a country foreign and defense policy without making at least a cursory reference to hard and soft power. In the late 1980s, as a counter to those who foresaw the decline of the United States as a great power resulting from rising costs and the apparent diminishing utility of military force, Nye (1990: 267) put forward the idea of soft versus hard power (see Figure 1 below). Behavioral power is presented as a continuum. At one extreme was hard or command power—the ability to change what others do through coercion (followed by inducement). At the other extreme was soft or co-optive power—the ability to shape what others want through attraction (preceded by agenda-setting).

Figure 1: Behavioral Power. J. Nye, Bound to Lead, 1990

As hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behavior of others, soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others (Nye, 2006). Hard power and soft power sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with each other (Nye, 2006).

In his approach to power, Nye (2006) regards soft power as of inspirational skills and hard power as of transactional skills. The former type of skills are represented by: (1) vision, which is the ability to articulate an inspiring picture of the future; (2) emotional intelligence, which is the self-mastery, discipline, and empathic capacity that allows leader to channel their personal passions and attract others; and (3) communication, which is needed by a leader to have the capacity to communicate effectively both by words, symbols, and personal example. The latter type is represented, on the other hand, by: (1) organizational capacity, which refers to the ability to manage the structures and reward systems of an organization to shape and to implement a strategy; and (2) political skill, which is crucial but more complex than first appears (Nye, 2006).

Another aspect of power, which covers both hard and soft powers, is contextual intelligence, which is in turn the ability to understand an evolving environment, and to capitalize on trends. This type of intelligence is described by

(Nye, 2006) as smart power (i.e. broad political skills) including understanding evolving environment, capitalizing on trends and adjusting style to context and followers' needs. Smart power is the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor's purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently (Wilson, 2008). Advancing smart power has become a national security imperative, driven both by long-term structural changes in international conditions and by short-term failures of the current administration.

Regarding the difference between hard (military) power and soft (humanitarian) power, sometimes one is faced with situations that he can not deal with. It was not soft power that freed Europe. It was hard power. There comes a time when soft power will not work, where, unfortunately, hard power is the only thing that works (Holguin, 2003).

According the realist school in international relations theory, the term hard power describes a nation or political body's ability to use economic incentives or military strength to influence other actors' behaviors. Power is linked with the possession of certain tangible resources, including population, territory, natural resources, economic and military strength, among others. Hard power is defined by the use of such resources to spur the behavior of other entities. The principal foundations of all states are good laws and good armies, and that a prince, therefore, must not have any other object nor any other thought but war, its institutions, and its discipline (Cahn, 1997: 22-24 as stated by Machiavelli). What is possible (i.e. for a state) depends on its resources, geographic position and determination, and on the resources, determination and domestic structure of other states (Kaplan, 1999 as stated by Kissinger).

Hobbes in the Leviathan expands the measures of power by adding the ability to control not just armed forces, but also economic and financial forces (Cahn, 1997: 141). Yet, armed strength remains, in international politics, as a threat or a potentiality, the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation (Morgenthau, 1950). In the fields of international relations and public diplomacy, Nye (2004) identifies hard power as the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will. Wilson (2008) describes it as the capacity to coerce another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise.

One of the most obvious exercises of hard power is the use of military intervention. It entails, quite simply, the use of military might to obtain one's objectives (Bush, 2003). Military force, however, is not the only coercive measure in a state's arsenal. The application of economic pressure can be deployed for similar ends. The threat of either military or economic force also functions as an exercise of hard power. This strategy—as referred by George (2004) as 'coercive diplomacy'—involves backing one's demands of an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand.

2.3 Foreign Policy Definition

2.3.1 General Definition of Foreign Policy

A state's foreign policy is defined in general as a set of goals outlining how this state will interact with other countries economically, politically, socially and militarily. Mahabir (2005) defines fireign policy as composed of goals sought, values set, decisions made and actions taken by states and national governments acting on their

behalf in the context of the external relations of national societies. This policy constitutes an attempt to design, manage and control the foreign relations in national societies. It is then a government's policy relating to matters beyond its own jurisdiction: usually relations with other nations and international organisation, international organisations in order to achieve national objectives.

Foreign policies are designed to help protect a state's national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity. Its change is most likely when decision makers perceive that current policies are producing painful costs; that a failure to change policy is virtually certain to result in further painful costs; and that at least one possible option may create an acceptable outcome, even if it is not highly likely (Welch, 2006).

Foreign policy must reflect the realities and demands of the global economy (Hagel, 2003). It is then necessary to work with the global suppliers to support more stable politics, including political and economic reforms and regional trade agreements, and to help resolve regional conflicts. Security and prosperity are directly connected to foreign policy. Foreign policy is the framework, or the structural housing, for a nation's future. It encompasses its security, economic, trade, and geo-political interests (Hagel, 2003).

Questions of war and peace, or foreign policy in general, are among the most dramatic issues in politics (Haar, 2009). Classical liberalism is applicable in international as well as domestic politics. Classical liberalism is the political theory characterized by a firm belief in individualism, negative freedom, non-religious natural law, spontaneous order, a limited state, and the rule of law (Haar, 2009). The balance of power is an important ordering mechanism. States differ in their military

power, and preventing one State from dominating or ruling over the others is therefore important. To keep a balance, sometimes minor wars must be allowed and certainly not everybody's natural rights can be safeguarded at all times. Yet more often the balance works to stabilize international order and allows many more states and people to survive or increase their freedom (Haar, 2009).

2.3.2 Power and Coercive Diplomacy

As the application of military power to meet vital national objectives (Campbell and O'Hanlon, 2006: 7), a state's power has certain strategies. These include a wide range of measures geared toward coercing or threatening other entities into compliance. These measures might include the use of 'sticks', such as the threat of military assault or the implementation of an economic embargo; they might also include the use of 'carrots', such as the promise of military protection or the reduction of trade barriers. However, critics have objected that it is the former which is often stressed; in other words, the 'stick' is preferred over the 'carrot' (Wilson, 2008).

The threat of military or economic force—whether explicitly stated or implicitly acknowledged—serves as a method of compelling behavior or say hard power or coercive diplomacy. Illustrations of coercive diplomacy in action can be seen in Kosovo in 1998 and between China and the U.S. in the early 1990's. In the former, President Milosevic's consent to UN Security Council Resolution 1199 in the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement may have been decided, according to some, by NATO's activation orders: the threat of an air campaign in Kosovo (Leurdijk, 1999). Similarly, the Memorandums of Understanding between the U.S. and China in the

early 1990's regarding IP rights were produced only after each simultaneously threatened trade sanctions (Baum, 2001).

While the use of hard power may serve to induce compliance, it also presents some glaring shortcomings with regard to its wielder's legitimacy and credibility. Hard power strategies that do not take into account a country's international image may have serious consequences. If a country's credibility abroad deteriorates, attitudes of mistrust tend to grow while international cooperation diminishes, such that the country's capacity to obtain its objectives is damaged. Some have suggested that what the U.S. and other political bodies need is an interlacing of hard power with the skillful use of diplomacy (Campbell and O'Hanlon, 2006: 9).

This would entail a more nuanced approach in which a state attempts to legitimate its power. Rather than relying solely on the coercive use of military and economic might, a state would attempt to garner acquiescence through the attractiveness of its culture and ideology or through the proliferation of its norms and values. It is this ability to set the agenda in world politics, to offer a sought-after example in terms of values or institutions on the international stage, that Nye (2004) calls indirect or soft power. Nye (2006) suggests, however, that a state's success at achieving its goals rests not on the exclusive use of either hard or soft power. For these thinkers, success depends upon a combination of both—what has been deemed 'smart power'.

As much as military strength, the dominance of a state's culture and language would sustain its power status (Keohane and Nye, 1998). Because the ability to

control others is often associated with the possession of certain resources, political leaders commonly define power as the possession of resources (Nye, 1990: 26). The virtue of this definition (i.e. of power) is that it makes power appear more concrete, measurable, and predictable than does the behavioral definition (Smith-Windsor, 2000).

Europe today is much different from the continent where Allied forces landed 65 years ago, when it was all about 'hard power'. Today, Europe has changed. Its focus now is on 'soft power', chiefly diplomacy and aid (Holmes, 2009). Many, if not most, Europeans credit soft power for the peace they have enjoyed for decades. Bridging the often hardened differences between states and shaping their decisions requires mainly negotiation and common understanding. The importance of military strength is downplayed and sometimes even seen as the main obstacle to peace. Even when its importance is acknowledged, it's a perfunctory afterthought (Holmes, 2009).

The problem here is not merely overconfidence in the process of 'talking' and trying to achieve 'mutual understanding'. Rather, it is about the interaction and sometimes clash of hardened interests and ideologies (Holmes, 2009). The ability to reassure friends, deter competitors, coerce belligerent states and defeat enemies does not rest on the strength of political commitment to diplomacy; it rests on the foundation of a powerful military. A state's national priorities can be advanced by diplomatic means only so long as this state retains a 'big stick'.

The role and importance of regional powers can be analyzed by various approaches of international relations. The concept of regional power has its origin in

the (neo-) realist school of thought (Wagner, 2005). It is based on the assumption that dominant economic resources and military capabilities can be equated with the ability of a state to influence its neighbors. Neo-realist approaches emphasize the hard power capacities of states, especially their military capabilities and economic strength (Wagner, 2005). Those enable regional powers to influence their neighbors and to protect themselves from disagreeable outside interference (Waltz 1979: 191-192).

However, liberal institutional approaches have emphasized soft power aspects with cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions as the main resources (Nye 1990: 167). Neo-realism and liberal-institutionalism have different understandings of the concept of power. Neo-realism emphasizes the capacity of states to influence others to behave as it wants them to behave whereas the co-optive power of liberal-institutionalism aims at "getting others to want what you want (Wagner, 2005 following Nye, 1990).

2.3.3 The Relation Between Military Power and Foreign Policy

Focusing too narrowly on military as a foreign policy instrument while neglecting other elements of power may unintentionally contribute to national and international insecurity (Carroll, 1998). Living in a global world has definite implications for policy in the international arena. Military force, or the threat of such force, has always been one policy option. However, economic sanctions have become a substitute for war or for using military power in particular. They have recently become a primary tool of carrying out foreign policy wishes across a very wide range of subject matter in the world (Carroll, 1998).

Too great an emphasis on a single form of power, such as military force, can actually reduce a nation's ability to respond effectively to international crises (Carroll, 1998). Using the military as the primary instrument of foreign policy can undermine the achievement of longer-term goals of policymakers and the public. A 'smart' power is a balance of hard military power with the soft power of diplomacy, development, cultural exchanges, education and science (Pellerin, 2009).

Political actors tend to be loss-averse, risk-acceptant when facing prospects of loss, and risk-averse when facing prospects of gain (Welch, 2005: 210). These losses are often viewed as more painful than gains are seen as pleasurable. That is, leaders are more likely to pay the inherent costs of foreign policy change to avoid perceived losses than to realize anticipated gains of equivalent magnitude, and only prospects of disproportionate gain are likely to motivate foreign policy change. The military's success in holding Iraq in check ensures a continued flow of oil from the Persian Gulf (Talbot, 1999).

2.4 Further Reading

Noam Chomsky, in an interview with Nermin Al-Mufti on the month-long US-Israeli onslaught on Lebanon, answers why Israel is given the right of self-defense while the Arabs are denied it. He quotes what Thucydides[2] stated in regard with the ancient war between Athens and Sparta: 'The strong do as they can, and the weak suffer as they must'. It is one of the leading principles of international affairs (Chomsky, 2006). It is actually known and understood that by Western standards there is no moral or legal justification for the war. With a vivid imagination, one can conjure up all sorts of

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[2] Thucydides is a Greek historian and an Athenian general who served in the war between Athens and Sparta. His book The History of the Peloponnesian War is an account of the Peloponnesian War in Ancient Greece, fought between the Peloponnesian League (led by Sparta) and the Delian League (led by Athens), lately translated by Rex Warner translation published by Penguin Classics in 1954.

pretexts. In the real world, there are none. And we may add the forgotten West Bank, where the US and Israel are proceeding with their plans to drive the last nails into the coffin of Palestinian national rights by their programs of annexation, canonization and imprisonment.

When we come to Israel's policy, different factors play a main role in shaping its foreign policy. Such are as: security, which is the most important factor, because Israel all the time feels that it is threatened by its their neighbors, whether they have boarders with it or not, and whether they are Arab or not; the Zionist movement and its doctrine to achieve certain nationalistic interests; Mistrust regardless of the signed peace treaties; stability in the region; the US interests in the region; and lastly the internal structure of the Israeli government.

Regarding Israel's military power as the main instrument in shaping its foreign policy, the Israeli interests require to be attained building up a strong army, which should be equipped with high technology and armament, including nuclear weapons as a deterrence power. This all because Israel looks forward to being the superior power and acceding the balance of power in the region in order to maintain its survival and security.

Indeed, the US continuous support to Israel in different dimensions and occasions, particularly in military affairs, is mostly derived from the Zionist Lobby in the US Congress and its influence on the US decision-makers. This helps Israel exploit the mutual interests to build up a strong army with a flow of supply from the United States, so that it can have all the requirements to become the superior power in

the region, and allows it as well to impose its conditions or at least affects the other certain party to comply with its interests.

As we have mentioned in the Introduction above, Israel since its establishment in 1984 now has been depending on force, regardless of all and any signed peace treaties with some Arab countries. It totally insisted on the legion of its army, which it lost in south Lebanon and which that represented the main reason to invade Gaza Strip in 2008, in order to return the legion of its army. In the aftermath of the war, Israel got embarrassed in front of the other countries and the international organizations even of the United States and Europe, because of its having violated the international laws, human rights and the humanitarian rules and regulations. This eventually limited the movement of many Israel's military leaders and even its Foreign Minster and other diplomats to go abroad. Some countries accept as per their constitutions to allow their tribunals and courts to prosecute war criminals and those who are concerned with violating the international law.

Neither the horror of history nor the arrogance of power can justify a state in aggressing another. The reliance on brute force to achieve convenient political results often leads politicians and militarists to go back to the drawing boards after the dust of war settles. Lessons learned are strictly of a military nature (Sabella, 2006): how best to counter the tactics of the adversary guerrilla forces; to finish off with them in the quickest manner; to ensure that one's forces and ingeniously adapted new military tactics would surprise the enemy.

An Army general who was also a historian by the name of Thucydides, already in the context of the war between Athens and Sparta identified fear as being the ultimate source of human political action (Kroger, 2006). A human association in this view is thus predicated on security, both in terms of what brings it about as well as in terms of what justifies it. Military capability, viewed in terms of the history of its own development, has constantly been found wanting. Renewal and regeneration of military capability seems to be an indispensable part of the military doctrine, conceived to address what turns out inevitably to be the insatiable (i.e. greedy) need of fear and foreign-policy change.

2.5 Summary

This Chapter presents a theoretical framework of the current study. It generally discusses the concepts of and the mutual association between military power and foreign policy. Herein, both military power and foreign policy are defined and approached, with explaining certain terms such as power being hard and soft power and diplomacy being cooptive and coercive.

To sum, military power is the main and crucial instrument of foreign policy. The relationship between military power and foreign policy is interrelated and mostly depends on how much strong a state's military power is and how much this power can affect others and achieve its interests.

III

JULY WAR SCENE

3.1 Back ground

The 2006 Lebanon War, also called the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War and known in Lebanon as the July War (AFP, 2006) and in Israel as the Second Lebanon War (Katz, 2006: 2) was a 34-day military conflict in Lebanon and northern Israel. The principal parties were Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israeli military. The war started on 12 July 2006, and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect in the morning on 14 August 2006, though it formally ended on 8 September 2006 when Israel lifted its naval blockade of Lebanon.

The war began when Hezbollah militants fired rockets at Israeli border towns as a diversion for an anti-tank missile attack on two armored Humvees patrolling the Israeli side of the border fence (New York Times, 2007). Of the seven Israeli soldiers in the two jeeps, two were wounded, three were killed, and two were captured and taken to Lebanon. Five more were killed in a failed Israeli rescue attempt. Israel responded with massive air-strikes and artillery fire on targets in Lebanon that damaged Lebanese civilian infrastructure, including Beirut's Rafic Hariri International Airport (which Israel alleged that Hezbollah used to import weapons and supplies) (CNN News, 2006), an air and naval blockade (Washington Post, 2006), and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah then launched more rockets into northern Israel and engaged the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in guerrilla warfare from hardened positions (Urquhart, 2006).

The war killed over a thousand people, mostly Lebanese civilians (Guardian, 2006; Reuters, 2006; Associated Press, 2006; Martin and Younes, 2008) severely damaged Lebanese civil infrastructure, and displaced approximately one million Lebanese (Watch, 2006) and 300,000–500,000 Israelis, although most were able to return to their homes (Relief Council, 2007). After the ceasefire, some parts of Southern Lebanon remained uninhabitable due to Israeli unexploded cluster bomblets (BBC New, 2008).

The United Nations Security Council on 11August 2006 unanimously approved UN Resolution 1701 in an effort to end the hostilities. The resolution, which was approved by both Lebanese and Israeli governments the following days, called for disarmament of Hezbollah, for withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon, and for the deployment of Lebanese soldiers and an enlarged United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) force in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese army began deploying in southern Lebanon on 17 August 2006. The blockade was lifted on 8 September 2006 (Pannell, 2006). On 1 October 2006, most Israeli troops withdrew from Lebanon, though the last of the troops continue to occupy the border-straddling village of Ghajar. In the time since the enactment of UNSCR 1701 both the Lebanese government and UNIFIL have stated that they will not disarm Hezbollah (Spiegel, 2006; People's Daily, 2006; Herald Tribune, 2007). The remains of the two captured soldiers, whose fates were unknown, were returned to Israel on 16 July 2008 as part of a prisoner exchange.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had engaged in cross-border attacks from southern Lebanon into Israel as far back as 1968, and the area became a significant base following the arrival of the PLO leadership and its Fatah brigade after

their 1971 expulsion from Jordan. Demographic tensions were running high over the Lebanese National Pact, which divided governmental powers among religious groups, leading in part to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). Concurrently, Syria began a 29-year military occupation. Israel's 1978 invasion of Lebanon failed to stem the Palestinian attacks, but Israel invaded Lebanon again in 1982 and forcibly expelled the PLO (Encarta, 2008). Israel withdrew to a borderland buffer zone in southern Lebanon, held with the aid of proxy militants in the South Lebanon Army (SLA) (Encarta, 2008). In 1985, a Shi'a militant group calling itself Hezbollah declared an armed struggle to end the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory (Encarta, 2008). When the Lebanese civil war ended and other warring factions agreed to disarm, Hezbollah and the SLA refused. Combat with Hezbollah led to a collapse of the SLA.

When in 2000 Israel withdrew from Southern Lebanon to the UN designated border, Hezbollah immediately followed. Citing Israeli control of the disputed Shebaa farms region and the internment of Lebanese prisoners in Israel, Hezbollah continued cross border attacks, and used the tactic of seizing soldiers from Israel as leverage for a prisoner exchange in 2004 (Palestinian Studies, 2008), though it also continues to call for an end to the state of Israel (Boston Globe, 2006).

3.2 Beginning of the war

At around 08:07 a.m. local time on 12 July 2006, Hezbollah launched diversionary rocket attacks toward Israeli military positions near the coast and near the border village of Zar'it (UN Interim, 2006) as well as on the Israeli town of Shlomi and other villages. At the same time, a Hezbollah ground contingent crossed the border into Israeli territory and attacked two Israeli armored Humvees patrolling on the Israeli

side of the Israel-Lebanon border, near Zar'it, killing three, injuring two, and capturing two Israeli soldiers (master sergeant Ehud Goldwasser and first sergeant Eldad Regev) (BBC News, 2006). Five more Israeli soldiers were killed, and a tank was destroyed on the Lebanese side of the border during an unsuccessful attempt to rescue the two prisoners of war.

Hezbollah named the attack "Operation Truthful Promise" after leader Hassan Nasrallah's public pledges over the prior year and a half to seize Israeli soldiers and swap them for four Lebanese held by Israel: Samir Kuntar (a Lebanese citizen captured during a terrorist attack in 1979, convicted of murdering civilians and a police officer); Nasim Nisr (an Israeli-Lebanese citizen tried and convicted for spying by Israel); Yahya Skaf (a Lebanese citizen whom Hezbollah claims was arrested in Israel, Israel denies) (UPC, 2008; BBC News, 2006); and Ali Faratan (another Lebanese citizen whom Hezbollah claims to be held in Israel).

Nasrallah claimed that Israel had broken a previous deal to release these prisoners, and since diplomacy had failed, violence was the only remaining option. Nasrallah declared: no military operation will return the Israeli captured soldiers, and the prisoners will not be returned except through one way: indirect negotiations and a trade of prisoners (Bawaba, 2008).

sraeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert described the seizure of the soldiers as an act of war by the sovereign country of Lebanon (Guardian, 2006; Ynet News, 2008), stating that Lebanon will bear the consequences of its actions (MFA, 2007) and promising a very painful and far-reaching response (Fletcher, 2006). Israel blamed the Lebanese government for the raid, as it was carried out from Lebanese territory and Hezbollah had two ministers serving in the Lebanese cabinet at that time (Alon,

2006). In response, Lebanese Prime Minister <u>Fouad Siniora</u> denied any knowledge of the raid and stated that he did not condone it (Manila Times, 2006; Daily Star, 2006). An emergency meeting of the Lebanese government reaffirmed this position (Qawas and Rafei, 2008).

The Israel Defense Forces attacked targets within Lebanon with artillery and airstrikes hours before the Israeli Cabinet met to discuss a response. The Israeli Air Force bombed several areas in Lebanon (bridges and roads, the Beirut airport) (China Radio, 2008), killing 44 civilians.

On 16 July, the Israeli Cabinet released a communiqué explaining that, although Israel had engaged in military operations within Lebanon, its war was not against the Lebanese government. The communiqué stated: "Israel is not fighting Lebanon but the terrorist element there, led by Nasrallah and his cohorts, who have made Lebanon a hostage and created Syrian- and Iranian-sponsored terrorist enclaves of murder" (MFA, 2007). When asked in August about the proportionality of the response, Prime Minister Olmert stated that the "war started not only by killing eight Israeli soldiers and abducting two but by shooting Katyusha and other rockets on the northern cities of Israel on that same morning. Indiscriminately, no country in Europe would have responded in such a restrained manner as Israel did" (Farrel, 2006).

3.3 Hezbollah conduct

During the campaign Hezbollah fired between 3,970 and 4,228 rockets at an unprecedented rate of more than 100 per day About 95% of these were 122 mm (4.8 in) Katyusha artillery rockets, which carried warheads up to 30 kg (66 <u>lb</u>) and

had a range of up to 30 km (JPA Center, 2008; BBC News, 2006). An estimated 23%
of these rockets hit cities and built-up areas across northern Israel, while the
remainder hit open areas (Guardian, 2008; Jane's Defense, 2006). Cities hit included
Haifa, Hadera, Nazareth, Tiberias, Nahariya, Safed, Shaghur, Afula, Kiryat Shmona,
Beit She'an, Karmiel, and Maalot, and dozens of Kibbutzim, Moshavim, and Druze
and Arab villages, as well as the northern West Bank (New York Times, 2006;
Greenberg, 2008; Ynet News, 2006; Defamation, 2009).

Hezbollah also engaged in guerrilla warfare with the IDF, attacking from well-
fortified positions. These attacks by small, well-armed units caused serious problems
for the IDF, especially through the use of sophisticated Russian-made anti-tank
guided missiles (ATGMs). According to Merkava tank program administration, 52
Merkava main battle tanks were damaged (45 of them by different kinds of ATGM),
missiles penetrated 22 tanks, but only 5 tanks were totally destroyed (2 of them by
improvised explosive devices). (see Figure 2: Hezbollah Attacks on Israel).

Hezbollah caused additional casualties using ATGMs to collapse buildings
onto Israeli troops sheltering inside. After the initial Israeli response, Hezbollah
declared an all-out military alert. Hezbollah was estimated to have 13,000 missiles at
the beginning of the conflict (Gardner, 2006). Israeli newspaper Haaretz described
Hezbollah as a trained, skilled, well-organized, and highly motivated infantry that was
equipped with the cream of modern weaponry from the arsenals of Syria, Iran, Russia,
and China (Tal, 2006). Hezbollah's satellite TV station Al-Manar reported that the

Figure 2: Hezbollah Attacks on Israel

attacks had included a Fajr-3 and a Ra'ad 1, both liquid-fuel missiles developed by Iran (Associated Press, 2006; Ynet News, 2006).

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah defended the attacks, saying that Hezbollah had started to act calmly, we focused on Israeli military bases and we didn't attack any settlement, however, since the first day, the enemy attacked Lebanese towns and murdered civilians —Hezbollah combatants had destroyed

military bases, while the Israelis killed civilians and targeted Lebanon's infrastructure (Islamic Resistance, 2006). Hezbollah apologized for shedding Muslim blood, and called on the Arabs of the Israeli city of Haifa to flee (USA Today, 2008). Hezbollah continued to use unguided rockets to shell northern Israel (Schiff, 2006).

According to a UN report, approximately around mid-July 2006, the Somalian Islamic Courts Union (ICU) sent about 720 men to Lebanon to fight alongside Hezbollah against the Israeli military. In exchange for the contribution of the Somali military force, Hezbollah arranged for additional support to be given to ICU by the governments of Iran and Syria (New York Times, 2006; Jamestown, 2008).

▪   On 12 July, Hezbollah launched rocket attacks on Zar'it, Shlomi, and other areas. Hezbollah troops entered Israel and attacked two armoured IDF Humvees. Three Israeli soldiers were killed in the ground attack; two were wounded, captured, and taken to Lebanon.

▪   On 13 July, Hezbollah launched rockets at Haifa for the first time, hitting a cable car station along with a few other buildings.

▪   On 14 July, Hezbollah attacked the INS Hanit, an Israeli navy Sa'ar 5-class corvette enforcing a naval blockade, with a what was believed to be a radar-guided C-802 anti-ship missile. Four sailors were killed and the warship was severely damaged.

▪   On 17 July, Hezbollah hit a railroad repair depot, killing eight workers. Hezbollah asserted that this attack was aimed at a large Israeli fuel storage plant adjacent to the railway facility. Haifa is home to many strategically valuable facilities such as shipyards and oil refineries (Sentinel, 2006; Associated Press, 2006).

▪ On 18 July, Hezbollah hit a hospital in Safed in northern Galilee, wounding eight (Siegel-Itzkovich, 2008).

▪ On 27 July, Hezbollah ambushed the Israeli forces in Bint Jbeil and killed eight soldiers. Israel said it also inflicted heavy losses on Hezbollah (BBC News, 2006).

▪ On 3 August, Nasrallah warned Israel against hitting Beirut and promised retaliation against Tel Aviv if the warning was not heeded (People's Daily (2006). He also stated that Hezbollah would stop its rocket campaign if Israel ceased aerial and artillery strikes on Lebanese towns and villages.

▪ On 4 August, Israel targeted the southern outskirts of Beirut, and later in the day, Hezbollah launched rockets at the Hadera region (Raved, 2008).

▪ On 6 August, 12 army reservists resting near the Lebanon border were killed in the deadliest barrage of Hezbollah rocket attacks so far. Three Israeli civilians were also killed in a dusk attack in the port of Haifa.

▪ On 9 August, nine Israeli soldiers were killed when the building they were taking cover in was struck by a Hezbollah anti-tank missile and collapsed.

▪ On 12 August, 24 Israeli soldiers were killed; the worst Israeli loss in a single day. Out of those 24, five soldiers were killed when Hezbollah shot down an Israeli helicopter, a first for Hezbollah (Jerusalem Post, 2006). Hezbollah claimed the helicopter had been attacked with a Waad missile (Jazeera, 2006).

3.4. Israeli conduct

During the campaign Israel's Air Force flew more than 12,000 combat missions, its Navy fired 2,500 shells, and its Army fired over 100,000 shells (Associated Press, 2006) (see Figure 3: Israeli Attacks on Lebanon). Large parts of the Lebanese civilian

infrastructure were destroyed, including 400 miles (640 km) of roads, 73 bridges, and 31 other targets such as Beirut's Rafic Hariri International Airport, ports, water and sewage treatment plants, electrical facilities, 25 fuel stations, 900 commercial structures, up to 350 schools and two hospitals, and 15,000 homes. Some 130,000 more homes were damaged (Associated Press, 2006; Guardian, 2006). Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz ordered commanders to prepare civil defense plans. One million Israelis had to stay near or in bomb shelters or security rooms, with some 250,000 civilians evacuating the north and relocating to other areas of the country.

▪ Early on 13 July 2006 Israel began attacks on civilian infrastructure that was believed to be used for arms replenishment by bombing the Rafic Hariri International Airport, forcing its closure and diversion of incoming flights to Cyprus. Israel subsequently imposed an air and sea blockade on Lebanon, and bombed the main Beirut – Damascus highway (Hasson et al., 2006).

▪ On 14 July 2006 the IDF bombed Nasrallah's offices in Beirut. Nasrallah addressed Israel, saying: you wanted an open war, and we are heading for an open war, and so we are ready for it (BBC News, 2006; NPR, 2006).

Figure 3: Israeli Attacks on Lebanon

- On 23 July 2006 Israeli land forces crossed into Lebanon in the Maroun al-Ras area, which overlooks several other locations said to have been used as launch sites for Hezbollah rockets (BBC News, 2006).

- On 25 July 2006 IDF engaged Hezbollah forces in the Battle of Bint Jbeil.

- On 26 July 2006 Israeli forces attacked and destroyed an UN observer post. Described as a nondeliberate attack by Israel, the post was shelled for hours before being bombed. UN forces made repeated calls to alert Israeli forces of the danger to the UN observers, all four of whom were killed. Rescuers were shelled as they attempted to reach the post (CTV, 2006).

- On 28 July 2006 Israeli paratroopers killed more than 20 Hezbollah militants in Bint Jbeil.

- On 30 July 2006 Israeli airstrikes hit an apartment building in Qana, killing 28 civilians, more than half of them children (HRW, 2006). The air-strike was widely condemned.

- On 31 July 2006 Israeli military forces engaged Hezbollah in the Battle of Ayta ash-Shab.

- On 4 August 2006 the IAF attacked a building in the area of al-Qaa around 10 kilometers from Hermel in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon. 33 farm workers were killed during the airstrike.

- On 5 August 2006 Israeli commandos carried out a nighttime raid in Tyre.

- On 7 August 2006 the IAF attacked the Shiyyah suburb in the Lebanese capital of Beirut, destroying three apartment buildings in the suburb, killing at least 50 people.

▪ On 12 August 2006 the IDF launches the 2006 Litani offensive in South Lebanon. Over the weekend Israeli forces in southern Lebanon nearly tripled in size (Greenberg, 2006; Katz, 2006).

▪ On 14 August 2006 the Israeli Air Force reported that they had killed the head of Hezbollah's Special Forces, whom they identified as Sajed Dewayer, while Hezbollah denied this claim (Greenberg, 2006).

During the Litani offensive, Israeli troops and armor engage Hezbollah fighters in The Battle of Wadi Saluki. Israeli tanks and infantry attacked the hill of Wadi Saluki. The tanks took heavy fire from well-placed anti-tank positions, but Israeli forces fought their way to the top of the hill and stormed the anti-tank positions. 12 Israeli soldiers and 80 Hezbollah fighters were killed. 80 minutes before the cessation of hostilities, the IDF targeted a Palestinian faction in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in Sidon, killing a UNRWA staff member (UNRWA, 2006).

3.5 International Action and Reaction

The war engendered worldwide concerns over infrastructure damage and the risks of escalation of the crisis, as well as mixed support and criticism of both Hezbollah and Israel (Forbes, 2006). The governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, and Canada, asserted Israel's right to self-defense. The United States government further responded by authorizing Israel's request for expedited shipment of precision-guided bombs, but did not announce the decision publicly (Cloud, 2006). United States President George W. Bush declared the conflict to be a part of the War on Terrorism (ABC News, 2006; CNN News, 2006). On July 20,

2006, the United States Congress voted overwhelmingly to support Israel's right to defend itself.

Among neighboring Middle Eastern nations, Iran, Syria, and Yemen voiced strong support for Hezbollah, while the Arab League, Egypt, and Jordan issued statements criticizing Hezbollah's actions (Fattah, 2006) and declaring support for Lebanon. Saudi Arabia found Hezbollah entirely responsible (Haaretz News, 2006). Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, the Palestinian Authority, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain agreed with the Saudi stance that Hezbollah's actions were unexpected, inappropriate and irresponsible acts.

Many worldwide protests and demonstrations appealed for an immediate ceasefire on both sides and expressed concern for the heavy loss of civilian life on all sides. Other demonstrations were held exclusively in favor of Lebanon or Israel. Numerous newspaper advertising campaigns, SMS and email appeals, and online petitions also occurred (Guardian, 2006). Various foreign governments assisted the evacuation of their citizens from Lebanon (BBC News, 2006).

3.6 Ceasefire and Reviews of the war

3.6.1 Ceasefire

Terms for a ceasefire had been drawn and revised several times over the course of the conflict, yet successful agreement between the two sides took several weeks. Hezbollah maintained the desire for an unconditional ceasefire (CTV, 2006), while Israel insisted upon a conditional ceasefire, including the return of the two seized soldiers (Jerusalem Post, 2006). Lebanon frequently pled for the United Nations

Security Council to call for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. John Bolton confirmed that the US and UK, with support from several Arab leaders, delayed the ceasefire process. Outsider efforts to interfere with a ceasefire only ended when it became apparent Hezbollah would not be easily defeated (BBC News, 2007).

On 11 August 2006 the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved UN Security Council Resolution 1701, in an effort to end the hostilities. It was accepted by the Lebanese government and Hezbollah on 12 August 2006, and by the Israeli government on 13 August 2006. The ceasefire took effect at 8:00 AM (5:00 AM GMT) on 14 August 2006 (CNN News, 2006).

Before the ceasefire, the two Hezbollah members of cabinet said that their militia would not disarm south of the Litani River, according to another senior member of the Lebanese cabinet (CNN News, 2006), while a top Hezbollah official similarly denied any intention of disarming in the south. Israel said it would stop withdrawing from Southern Lebanon if Lebanese troops were not deployed there within a matter of days (Reuters, 2006).

Following the UN-brokered ceasefire, there were mixed responses on who had gained or lost the most in the war. Iran and Syria proclaimed a victory for Hezbollah, while the Israeli and United States administrations declared that Hezbollah lost the conflict.

3.6.2 Reactions in Lebanon

On 27 August, Hassan Nasrallah apologised to the Lebanese people for the incident that sparked the war, saying: had we known that the capture of the soldiers would have led to this, we would definitely not have done it. This was the day before UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's visit to Lebanon (BBC News, 2008). On 22 September, some eight hundred thousand Hezbollah supporters gathered in Beirut for a victory rally (CNN News, The (2007). Nasrallah then said that Hezbollah should celebrate their divine and strategic victory.

Lebanese desire to emigrate has increased since the war. Over a fifth of Shias, a quarter of Sunnis, and nearly half of Maronites have expressed the desire to leave Lebanon (Bassam, 2006). Nearly a third of Maronites have already submitted visa applications to foreign embassies, and another 60,000 Christians have already fled, as of April 2007. Lebanese Christians are concerned that their influence is waning, fear the apparent rise of radical Islam, and worry of Sunni-Shia sectarianism (Hirst, 2007).

3.6.3 Reactions in Israel

Within hours of Israeli's bombing of Lebanon on 13 July 2006, hundreds of protesters gathered in Tel Aviv to oppose the war (Beinin, 2009). On 22 July, about 2,000 people, including many Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, demanded an end to the assault on Lebanon during a protest march in Tel Aviv's Rabin Square (Somfalvi, 2006). On August 5, some Israelis demonstrated in Tel Aviv, including former Knesset members of the Meretz party, Mossi Raz, Naomi Hazan and Yael Dayan.

Initially, in a poll by an Israeli radio station, Israelis were split on the outcome with the majority believing that no one won (Herald Tribune, 2006). By 25 August, 63% of Israelis polled wanted Olmert to resign due to his handling of the war (Kalman, 2006). Olmert admitted to the Knesset that there were mistakes in the war in Lebanon (United Press, 2006), though he framed UN Security Council resolution 1701 as an accomplishment for Israel that would bring home the captured soldiers, and said that the operations had altered the regional strategic balance vis-à-vis Hezbollah (Israeli PM, 2008). The Israeli Chief of Staff Dan Halutz admitted to failings in the conflict (BBC News, The (2006). On 15 August, Israeli government and defense officials called for Halutz' resignation following a stock scandal in which he admitted selling stocks hours before the start of the Israeli offensive (France-Presse, 2006). Halutz subsequently resigned on 17 January 2007.

On 21 August, a group of demobilized Israel reserve soldiers and parents of soldiers killed in the fighting started a movement calling for the resignation of Olmert and the establishment of a state commission of inquiry. They set up a protest tent opposite the Knesset and grew to over 2,000 supporters by 25 August, including the influential Movement for Quality Government. On 28 August, Olmert announced that there would be no independent state or governmental commission of inquiry, but two internal inspection probes, one to investigate the political echelon and one to examine the IDF, and likely a third commission to examine the Home Front, to be announced at a later date. These would have a more limited mandate and less authority than a single inquiry commission headed by a retired judge (Haaretz News, 2006). The political and military committees were to be headed by former director of Mossad Nahum Admoni and former Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, respectively.

Critics argued that these committees amount to a whitewash, due to their limited authority, limited investigatory scope, their self-appointed basis, and that neither would be headed by a retired judge.

Due to these pressures, on 11 October, Admoni was replaced by retired justice Eliyahu Winograd as chair of the political probe, and the probe itself was elevated to the status of governmental commission with near-state commission mandate: the Winograd Commission. On 12 September, former defense minister Moshe Arens spoke of the defeat of Israel in calling for a state committee of inquiry. He said that Israel had lost to a very small group of people, 5000 Hezbollah fighters, which should have been no match at all for the IDF, and stated that the conflict could have some very fateful consequences for the future (Haaretz News, 2006). Disclosing his intent to shortly resign, Ilan Harari, the IDF's chief education officer, stated at a conference of senior IDF officers that Israel lost the war, becoming the first senior active duty officer to publicly state such an opinion.

IDF Major General Yiftah Ron Tal, on 4 October 2006 became the second and highest ranking serving officer to express his opinion that the IDF failed to win the day in the battle against Hezbollah as well as calling for Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz' resignation. Ron-Tal was subsequently fired for making those and other critical comments (Harel, 2006). Hezbollah was quick to use the findings of the report to bolster its claims of victory over the vastly superior Israeli military and to criticize the Lebanese government's handling of the conflict (Zambelis, 2007).

In March 2007, the Israeli Ministerial Committee for Symbols and Ceremonies decided that the conflict would be defined as a war, following pressure from bereaved

families (Sofer, 2007). Two days later, the Committee decided to name the war the Second Lebanon War, a decision that was subsequently approved by the Israeli cabinet.

3.6.4 Winograd Commission Report

According to the Winograd Commission Report, the Second Lebanon War was regarded as a missed opportunity and that Israel initiated a long war, which ended without a defined military victory. The report continued to state that a semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology advantages. Furthermore, Hezbollah's rocket attacks continued throughout the war and the IDF did not provide an effective response to it. Following a long period of using standoff fire power and limited ground activities, the IDF launched a large scale ground offensive close to the UN Security Council's resolution which imposed a cease-fire.

Later in the Report, the Commission stated that a decision was made in the night of July 12th to react to the kidnapping with immediate and substantive military action and to set ambitious goals. This decision had immediate repercussions in that subsequent decisions were limited mainly to a choice between a) a short, painful and unexpected blow on Hezbollah and b) to bring about a significant change of the reality in the South of Lebanon with a large ground operation, occupying the South of Lebanon and cleaning it of Hezbollah. The fact Israel went to war before it decided which option to select and without an exit strategy, all these constituted serious failures of the decision making process. As for achievements, the Commission

reported that SC resolution 1701, and the fact that it was adopted unanimously, were an achievement for Israel (New York Times, 2006).

3.6.5 Reactions in the Rest of the World

In the aftermath of the conflict US President George Bush said that Hezbollah was responsible for starting the war and that the group suffered a defeat at the hands of Israel (Pickler, 2006). Bush further dismissed claims of victory by Hezbollah leaders, stating: how can you claim victory when at one time you were a state within a state, safe within southern Lebanon, and now you're going to be replaced by a Lebanese army and an international force (White House, 2008)? The Economist magazine concluded that by surviving this asymmetrical military conflict with Israel, Hezbollah effectively emerged with a military and political victory from this conflict. They cite the facts that Hezbollah was able to sustain defenses on Lebanese soil and inflict unmitigated rocket attacks on Israeli civilians in the face of a punishing air and land campaign by the IDF (Economist, 2006).

In the tactical arena, Hezbollah proved a worthy adversary for IDF ground forces. Its use of swarming ATGMs and RPGs against Israeli tanks was both shrewd and inventive. Of the 114 IDF personnel killed during the war, 30 were tank crewmen. Out of the 400 tanks involved in the fighting in southern Lebanon, 48 were hit, 40 were damaged, and 20 penetrated. It is believed that five Merkavas were completely destroyed. Clearly, Hezbollah has mastered the art of light infantry/ATGM tactics against heavy mechanized forces. Hezbollah also deserves high marks for its innovative use of sophisticated ambushes and the clever use of both direct and indirect fires. The lackluster performance of the IDF in the 2006

Hezbollah-Israeli war was the result of a multiplicity of factors. Halutz's steadfast confidence in air power, coupled with his disdain for land warfare, increased the strength of the IAF at the expense of the ground forces. While continuing COIN operations against the Palestinians, the IDF saw its budget for ground forces slashed and training for major combat operations by divisions and brigades greatly reduced. Within the IDF reserve, equipment was not replaced or repaired, and the tactical skills of both reserve and regular ground forces continued to decline. Training for reserve tank crewmen was all but forgotten (Matthews, 2007).

In a speech given on August 15, 2006, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad claimed that the Arab resistance against Israel would continue to grow stronger, saying: your weapons, warplanes, rockets and even your atomic bomb will not protect you in the future (SANA, 2008). In April 2007, the Financial Times claimed that some US officials trying to limit the Turkish response to Kurdish attacks had privately described the Israeli experience as a strategic defeat that failed to meet military goals, heaped widespread condemnation upon it, and punctured the myth of the invincibility of the Israeli army (Dinmore, 2007).

UNIFIL has been given an expanded mandate, including the ability to use force to ensure that their area of operations is not used for hostile activities and to resist attempts by force to prevent them from discharging their duties (UN News, 2006). British military historian John Keegan concluded that the outcome of the war was misreported as an Israeli defeat due to anti-Israel bias in the international media (Keegan, 2006).

3.7 Other consequences of the War

3.7.1 Casualties

•   Lebanese civilians: The Lebanese top police office and the Lebanon Ministry of Health, citing hospitals, death certificates, local authorities, and eye witnesses, put the death toll at 1,123—37 soldiers and police officers, 894 identified victims, and 192 unidentified ones (UNICEF, 2006). The Lebanon Higher Relief Council (HRC) put the Lebanese death toll at 1,191, citing the health ministry and police, as well as other state agencies. The Associated Press estimated the figure at 1,035.

•   Hezbollah military: Hezbollah casualty figures are difficult to ascertain, with claims and estimates by different groups and individuals ranging from 250 to 1,000. However, Hezbollah is known to have sustained more fatalities than Israel during the conflict. Hezbollah's leadership claims that 250 of their fighters were killed in the conflict, while Israel estimated that its forces had killed 600 Hezbollah fighters. In addition, Israel claimed to have the names of 532 dead Hezbollah fighters (Rabinovich, 2006; Crooke and Perry, 2006).

•   Lebanese military: Lebanon sided with Hezbollah during the war. Though rarely engaged in combat, 46 Lebanese soldiers were killed and 100 soldiers were wounded. One soldier was killed in combat during the Tyre raid, and the rest were killed or wounded in Israeli strikes. Furthermore, the Amal movement, a militia that fought alongside Hezbollah, suffered 17 dead. The Lebanese Communist Party, which chose to fight with Hezbollah, suffered 12 dead. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine---General Command, a Palestinian militia that also fought with Hezbollah, suffered the loss of 2 fighters killed.

•   Israeli civilians: Most Israeli civilians fled the region or took refuge in bomb shelters as Hezbollah fired rockets. Hezbollah rockets killed 43 Israeli civilians during

the conflict, including four who died of heart attacks from rocket attacks (Whitson, 2006). In addition, 4,262 civilians were injured–33 seriously wounded, 68 moderately, 1,388 lightly, and 2,773 were treated for shock and anxiety. According to Human Rights Watch, these bombs may have killed only 43 civilians, but that says more about the availability of warning systems and bomb shelters throughout most of Northern Israel and the evacuation of more than 350,000 people than it does about Hezbollah's intentions.

• Israeli military: Figures for the Israel Defense Forces troops killed, given by Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, range from 117 to 119 (MFA, 2007). The latter figure contains two IDF fatalities that occurred after the ceasefire went into effect. Both these figures are incomplete as they do not contain two IDF fatalities from the Zar'it-Shtula incident that started the war, whose fates were not confirmed until their bodies were exchanged for Lebanese prisoners in 2008. The total casualty toll for the IDF, including the dead from the Zar'it-Shtula incident, is 121 dead and 628 wounded.

3.7.2 Financial Repercussions

The fighting resulted in a huge financial setback for Lebanon, with an official estimate of a fall in growth from +6% to -5% and US$5 Billion (22% of GDP) (UNDP, 2008) in direct and indirect costs, while the cost for Israel was estimated at US$3.5 billion (Reuters, 2007). Indirect costs to Israel include a cut in growth by 0.9% (Wrobel, Sharon (2007), and the cost to tourism was estimated at 0.4% of Israel's GDP in the following year (Borger, 2006).

According to one analyst in the Associated Press, the main casualty was the fragile unity between Lebanon's sectarian and political groups (Kuwait Times, 2006), though an Asia Times piece points to Free Patriotic Movement head Michel Aoun's

support for Hezbollah and provision of housing for Shiite refugees as evidence for strengthened relations.

3.7.3 Media Controversy

Several media commentators and journalists have alleged an intentionally distorted coverage of the events, in favor of Hezbollah, by means of photo manipulation, staging by Hezbollah or by journalists, and false or misleading captioning (Gross, 2006). On 18 July 2006 Hezbollah Press Officer Hussein Nabulsi took CNN's Nic Robertson on an exclusive tour of southern Beirut. Robertson noted that despite his minder's anxiety about explosions in the area, it was clear that Hezbollah had sophisticated media relations and were in control of the situation. Hezbollah designated the places that they went to, and the journalists certainly didn't have time to go into the houses or lift up the rubble to see what was underneath. According to his reports, there was no doubt that the bombs were hitting Hezbollah facilities, and while there appeared to be a lot of civilian damage, a lot of civilian properties, he reiterated that he could not verify the civilian nature of the destroyed buildings (CNN News (2007).

CNN's Charlie Moore described a Hezbollah press tour of a bombed-out area in southern Beirut on 23 July 2006 as a dog-and-pony show due to perceived staging, misrepresentation of the nature of the destroyed areas, and strict directives about when and with whom interviews could take place (CNN News, 2006). In the same interview aired on 23 July 2006, CNN's John Roberts, who was reporting from an Israeli artillery battery on the Lebanese border, stated that he had to take everything he was told with a grain of salt, citing mutual recriminations of civilian targeting

which he was unable to verify independently. Reuters withdrew over 900 photographs by Adnan Hajj, a Lebanese freelance photographer, after he admitted to digitally adding and darkening smoke spirals in photographs of an attack on Beirut (Reuters, 2007). Photographs submitted to Reuters and Associated Press showed one Lebanese woman mourning on two different pictures taken by two photographers, allegedly taken two weeks apart (Herrmann, 2006). It is common practice to send more than one photographer to an incident (Memmott, 2006).

3.8 Post-Ceasefire Events

In the days following the 14 August 2006 ceasefire, Hezbollah launched dozens of rockets and mortars inside southern Lebanon, which Israel did not respond to, though there were several instances where Israeli troops killed armed Hezbollah members approaching their positions (CNN News, 2006; Associated Press, 2006). Israeli warplanes continued conducting numerous flyovers and maneuvers above southern Lebanon, which Israel said did not violate the ceasefire (Janelle, 2006). On 19 August 2006, Israel launched a raid in Lebanon's eastern Beqaa Valley it says was aimed at disrupting Hezbollah's weapons supply from Syria and Iran (CNN News (2008). Lebanese officials said the Israelis were apparently seeking a guerrilla target in a school (Washington Post, 2006; Morales, 2006).

Israel's aerial and commando operations were criticized by Kofi Annan as violations of the ceasefire, which he said they had conducted the majority of, and he also protested the continued embargo. France, then leading UNIFIL, also issued criticism of the flyovers, which it interpreted as aggressive (Daily Telegraph, 2006). Israel argued that the ceasefire is based on (UN Resolution) 1701 which calls for an

international arms embargo against Hezbollah, and said the embargo could be lifted after full implementation of the cease-fire but Annan said that UNIFIL would only interdict arms at Lebanon's request (BBC News, 2008). On 7 September 2006 and 8 September 2006 respectively, aviation and naval blockades were lifted. In the second half of September Hezbollah claimed victory and asserted an improvement in their position, and they redeployed to some positions on the border (Dakroub, 2006) as Israel completed its withdrawal from Lebanon save border-straddling Ghajar (All Headline News, 2006).

3.9 Summary

This Chapter presents the general scene of the July War. The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is explained herein from the very beginning with describing both Hezbollah and Israel's actions against each other.

The international action and reaction are also described herein, until the ceasefire is announced and the various reactions whether in lebanon, Israel or in the rest of the world are shown, along with describing the impacts of the July War in general in terms of causualities, financial repercussions and media controversies.

IV

IMPACTS ON ISRAEl's FOREIGN POLICY

4.1 Introduction

A war is historically known as a military combat between two or say a limited number of parties having clear endings and definitive outcomes. It would end with surrenders and peace treaties, ceremonies and victory marches (Waxman, 2007). Wars today rarely end so clearly, if they end at all, and mostly involve too many parties. July War is that of-long-term and radical-change war, where victory is controversial and defeat contentious. It is an outrageous, offensive war which was deemed to be an approach for having the 'New/US-colonized Middle East' formed. In stark contrast to the Israeli actions in Gaza and the West Bank, July War was much more about American designs than Israeli ones.

Although July War can be regarded in some respects as a limited war between Israel and a non-state actor in one Arab country, the war had an extensive impact on politics and power perceptions in the region, comparable to the effects of larger and wider wars. It was the first war that did not end in victory for Israel; it was the first Iranian proxy war against Israel; it was the first large-scale Islamist war against Israel; it was another partial defeat for US policy; it proved the efficacy of new ways of confronting Israel; and it presented Syria with new opportunities (Salem, 2008) along with other impacts more.

With a quick look at the situation after the war, the claims of victory in Lebanon were mixed with a sober assessment of the massive socio-economic losses,

and the popular unity during the war was followed by deep division (Waxman, 2007; Salem, 2008). In the region, popular support for Hezbollah during the war was followed by a more mixed response to Hezbollah's role in the protests in Beirut that began in December 2006 and that have left the country paralyzed and on the brink of civil war. Syria and Iran have also had mixed reactions to the war, finding both benefit and loss in its outcome. Their Middle East policies are now strategically linked to Hezbollah's political preeminence in Lebanon (Rabil, 2008). In Syria, the war basked in the reflected glow of Hezbollah's strong performance in the war and could claim credibility for its strong anti-American and anti-Israeli line and for its long term support for Hezbollah. In Iran, most reports indicate that Tehran perceived the summer war as having very mixed results and Iran benefited greatly in credibility and popular support in the Arab and Islamic world for the strong performance of Hezbollah (Salem, 2008). In Saudi Arabia, the summer war has been causing serious rethinking of regional policy there, as King Abdullah felt the need to put more muscle behind its traditional foreign policy, which had been built upon financing friends and paying off enemies in a policy built almost exclusively on purse strings.

The United States administration, too, has given a mixed reading of the war, feeling that some of its interests had been served and others had been frustrated (Gambill, 2006). In Israel, on the other hand, the sense of failure was confirmed with official investigations into the handling of the war, resignations and political infighting. Although it was the fifth Israeli war in Lebanon, the after-effects of this war shook Israel for months. In spite of the fact that the human and socio-economic damage to Israel amounted to barely 5% of the damage suffered in Lebanon, the war had enormous political and military impacts on Israel (Waxman, 2007). Although

most Israelis supported the war at first, they became deeply dissatisfied with the way
it was conducted, and the war ended with most Israelis feeling that Israel, while it had
not perhaps lost outright, had not won the war, and its nemesis, Hezbollah, had
survived and had even scored a number of victories, such as continuing to launch
rockets into Israel throughout the war, and beating Israeli tank and infantry columns
on the battlefield. Israelis must now learn in the aftermath of their war with
Hezbollah. Although they are certainly used to a constant state of hostility, Israelis are
also accustomed to quick and decisive military victories.

The political leadership in Israel has miserably failed in seeking a long lasting
political solution to the conflict that is based on justice and respect for human rights.
Instead it has relied on military strategists with a formidable and merciless military
machine in order to prepare the ground for an eventual political solution (Sabella,
2006). Israel has learned from its military history that the best wars are those won in
less than 7 days. Then Israel and its politicians would rest without need for a serious
political process to resolve long standing conflict with its neighbors. The military
superiority would ensure that the advantageous status quo would always remain in
Israel's favor. The month-long war was neither as quick as Israelis had hoped nor as
decisive as they had expected. Instead, it ended with a fragile cease-fire and both sides
declaring victory (Waxman, 2007). Recriminations and accusations over the war were
flying in Israel as the country comes to terms with a war that, for the first time in its
history, many believe Israel lost.

The public perception that Israel lost the war with Hezbollah is widespread in
Israel and around the world. It will likely have a great impact not only on Israeli

domestic politics and the political fortunes of the Olmert government but also on future Israeli strategy and foreign policy in the Middle East (Waxman, 2007). Israel's political and military leaders clung to the notion that airpower and Lebanese military deployment to the South could serve as the primary components of a winning strategy (Glick, 2008). The failure of Israeli strategic leadership to base their strategy on reality caused Israel to fail to achieve its stated objectives in the war. And Israel's failure constituted a massive victory for Hezbollah and its state sponsors. The lessons that Israel draws from its recent war with Hezbollah will shape future Israeli thinking and the future of its relations with the Palestinians and the rest of the Middle East. It is imperative therefore that Israel learns the right lessons from the war.

4.2 Military Escalation

Israelis have long distinguished between two kinds of wars: the unavoidable and the voluntary. Although the latter are always controversial (as in Israel's 1982 war in Lebanon) the former, popularly dubbed wars of no choice, are considered just wars and receive massive public support (Inbar, 1989). A war of no choice is a defensive war that is forced on Israel, thereby absolving the country and its leadership of any moral responsibility for its outbreak and the subsequent deaths incurred on each side (Waxman, 2007).

At the time, most Israelis certainly thought so, which is why it enjoyed their almost unanimous support. After all, Israel had completely withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in May 2000 and had no intention of sending them back in (Waxman, 2007). On the morning of 12 July 2006, Hezbollah fighters crossed the border into Israel and attacked an Israeli patrol. A number of Israeli military vehicles and a tank got

involved in the clashes, at the end of which Hezbollah fighters returned to Lebanon with two captured Israeli soldiers. Eight other soldiers were killed. At the same time Hezbollah carried out diversionary attacks along the border. Hezbollah officials told Amnesty International that no civilian was targeted on 12 July, although according to press accounts a number were injured in these other attacks (Harel, 2006; US Amnesty, 2007; Newton et al, 2006; Friedman, 2006).

As the Israelis do not negotiate and in general do not trade with Hezbollah, Israeli forces retaliated against Hezbollah strongholds in Southwest Lebanon the same day. They sent troops across the border to search for the missing men (Friedman, 2006). This rapidly escalated into a full-scale invasion and a surprisingly strong defensive reaction by Hezbollah who had thousands of rockets instead of the hundreds that Israel probably expected. Hezbollah on the other hand launched a barrage of mortar shells and katyusha rockets on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) outposts and civilian communities near the border as a diversionary tactic (Waxman, 2007). What made this attack even more provocative was the fact that it occurred outside the disputed Shebaa Farms area, where all previous Hezbollah assaults had taken place since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. By targeting civilians and attacking beyond the Shebaa Farms, Hezbollah broke the informal cease fire rules by which both sides had abided in the six years since Israel left Lebanon in 2000.

The mutual deterrence, effectively a balance of terror between Israel and Hezbollah, that ensured caution on both sides collapsed as a result of Hezbollah's July 12 attack and Israel's fierce response to it (Waxman, 2007). Although Hezbollah probably anticipated a stronger-than-usual reaction from Israel, it did not expect the

large-scale military reprisal Israel conducted against Lebanese infrastructure, destroying runways at Beirut's airport and the main highway between Beirut and Damascus, as well as Hezbollah strongholds. If Hezbollah's initial attack constituted a minor breach of the rules of the game, albeit a highly provocative one, Israel's response ended the game completely. Israel had always played this game reluctantly but at that point decided that it was no longer willing to play at all. Israel's leadership was ill-prepared for the summer 2006 war against Hezbollah. Israeli politicians and planners displayed strategic blindness. While denying the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) victory, they squandered an opportunity to destroy the bulk of Hezbollah's military presence in southern Lebanon, settle regional scores, enhance Israel's deterrence, and strengthen Jerusalem's alliance with Washington (Inbar, 2007). Israel's highest political and military echelons committed serious strategic errors in preparation for, during execution, and in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon campaign. Together, these errors enabled Hezbollah to persevere against the larger, better-equipped Israeli military and emerge as perhaps an even greater threat. Failure to prepare undercut Israeli operations from the start. Before the war, Israeli planners had unrealistic expectations about armed conflict with Hezbollah. They planned for small skirmishes, not for a large-scale, conventional military campaign. Some of Israel's reluctance to plan for action inside Lebanon might have been rooted in former prime minister Ariel Sharon's legacy (Inbar, 2007).

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's decision to escalate the conflict with Hezbollah was, paradoxically, born out of a sense both of Israel's strength and its weakness, as well as of opportunity and danger (Waxman, 2007). The opportunity lay in using Israel's military might to bring about a new order in Lebanon, one in which

Hezbollah would lose its de facto ministate in the south and the Lebanese government would finally extend its sovereignty over that region.

The withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005 following the Cedar Revolution and the election of a pro-Western, anti-Syrian Lebanese government already increased pressure on Hezbollah to abandon its autonomous military standing in the country and transform itself into a peaceful political party. Yet, Hezbollah had been resisting this transformation; and its pacification, if at all possible, could have taken years. Hezbollah's attack gave Israel an opportunity to facilitate and hasten this process (Waxman, 2007).

Israel hoped that if Lebanon, not just Hezbollah, was made to suffer for Hezbollah's adventurism, Lebanon's political will to rein Hezbollah in would finally increase. This calculation explains Israel's decision to bomb not only Hezbollah positions but also Lebanese civilian infrastructure (Waxman, 2007). Israel felt that, for once, it was diplomatically in a strong position to take military action because it was reacting to a clear act of aggression. Israel could also capitalize on the existing support internationally, particularly U.S. and French, for Hezbollah's disarmament and the deployment of Lebanese troops to the border with Israel, which was expressed most clearly in UN Security Council Resolution 1559, passed in February 2004.

Israel's military escalation was also a response to a perceived weakness and growing danger: the steady erosion of Israeli deterrence. This erosion began with Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, which was hailed in Lebanon and around the Arab world as a victory for Hezbollah and a sign of Israel's diminishing ability to

withstand Arab resistance due to its society's aversion to casualties. One result of this perception, from this point of view, was the Palestinians' renewal of armed conflict just months later with the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000. Subsequent events only reinforced this perception of Israeli weakness (Waxman, 2007).

Hezbollah's repeated attacks against Israel were met with only mild and ineffectual Israeli responses that merely emboldened the group. Most damaging was Israel's second unilateral withdrawal, this time from Gaza in August 2005, which once again appeared to be a triumph for armed resistance, with Hamas this time reaping the political rewards (Waxman, 2007). Israel's military restraint and territorial disengagements signaled to its adversaries that its once famed and feared willingness to fight was a thing of the past and that the time was ripe to intensify attacks against it.

For a state in a hostile region with many enemies, a loss of deterrence is a recipe for disaster. Military deterrence has been the cornerstone of Israeli strategy in the Middle East since the state's establishment. Even though Israel had undoubtedly retained its military might—if anything, the military balance of power in the region has continued to tilt in Israel's favor—its enemies began to doubt its will to use force decisively. The continued firing of Qassam rockets into southern Israel after Israel's disengagement from Gaza; the June 25 killing of two Israeli soldiers and abduction of a third by Palestinian militant groups, including Hamas's military wing; and Hezbollah's subsequent cross-border ambush and seizure of Israeli soldiers had the cumulative affect of demonstrating to Israel's leadership that its deterrent effect had

eroded (Waxman, 2007). The three kidnapped soldiers personified Israel's new vulnerability and the humiliation of the once-vaunted and highly symbolic IDF.

A limited military retaliation, third-party negotiations, and a prisoner exchange was now deemed insufficient (Waxman, 2007). Olmert decided that the time had come for a devastating Israeli response that would serve to restore its deterrence capability. It would deliver a stern message to all of Israel's enemies, not only Hamas and Hezbollah but also their Syrian and Iranian patrons that Israel would not be bullied into submission but would strike back with a vengeance.

There was another strategic consideration behind Israel's decision to escalate the conflict with Hezbollah. It was well known that Hezbollah had amassed thousands of short-range katyusha rockets (approximately 13,000 in total), roughly 500 medium-range rockets (the Fajr-3 and Fajr-5), and dozens of long-range rockets (the Zelzal-2) that were capable of striking deep inside Israel (Waxman, 2007).

Hezbollah's missile capability represented a strategic threat to Israel, giving Hezbollah the ability to terrorize much of Israel's population and paralyze its economic life, both of which are concentrated in the narrow coastal strip from Tel Aviv to Haifa. It also meant that Iran had an indirect but highly effective means of retaliating against Israel in the event of an Israeli or U.S. strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, a scenario that was by no means far-fetched given the growing concern in both countries over Tehran's alleged clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Hezbollah's ability to launch a massive missile attack against Israeli towns and cities, whether of its own accord or on behalf of its patron state, was something that Israel could not tolerate indefinitely. The logic of preventive war was another factor that convinced Olmert to abandon restraint and take decisive action to eliminate or at least degrade Hezbollah's missile capability when the opportunity presented itself.

4.3 Mission Outcomes

Beyond the actual results of the summer war, many Israelis were concerned that the war objectives were not accomplished and the relative Israeli defeat by Hezbollah had dangerous general effects, such as damaging the deterrent image of Israeli invincibility that had been built up since the 1967 war, and illustrating a new style of guerrilla or irregular warfare that was highly effective against Israel and could be learned and used by other groups in the region, such as Hamas, or others. The results of Israel's war with Hezbollah appear to have fallen short of Israel's ambitious objectives. The Olmert government's conduct of the war is widely faulted. Critics accuse it of poor planning, intelligence failures, and an over-reliance on airpower and of providing insufficient ground troops and inadequate supplies to those troops (Waxman, 2007).

Heavy-handed military tactics incurred large numbers of civilian casualties and destroyed infrastructure, embittering local populations and providing the enemy with new recruits. The inability of the larger, better armed, and more technologically advanced IDF to defeat small bands of guerrilla fighters calls into question the Israeli military's all-powerful image.

Even the most advanced and adept armies can find it difficult to accomplish the ambitious military and political objectives set by their civilian leaders. Even when more modest goals have been achieved, the public's high expectations, established by their governments, can remain unsatisfied. This is essentially where Israel now finds itself (Waxman, 2007). At the political level, the conduct of the war discredited the Israeli leadership: Prime Minister Olmert, Defense Minister Peretz and Israeli Defense Force (IDF) chief Halutz resigned in mid-January. While Lebanon was stuck in division and dissension after the war, so too was Israel, with accusations and counter-accusations relating to the war shaking the Olmert government, strengthening the right wing Likud, and raising the possibility of early elections. The war also halted the plan that Sharon had devised and Kadima and Olmert were implementing, which had been launched with the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, and was to continue with completion of the wall in the West Bank, partial unilateral withdrawals from parts of the West Bank outside the wall, and hunkering down behind the wall as the new de facto border of Israel. That plan was now dead. Israel had neither won a war, nor had an active plan for peace or security (Salem, 2008).

During the five weeks (33 days) of fighting in July and August, 156 Israelis were killed, including 39 civilians (Zunes, 2007), and some 4,000 Hezbollah rockets hit Israel, paralyzing life in the north and forcing hundreds of thousands of Israelis into bomb shelters and more than half a million to flee their homes (Kraft, 2006: 12), many Israelis are left wondering what the war achieved and if it was really worth it.

According to a poll taken on August 13, 2006, the day the UN-sponsored cease-fire went into effect, 58 percent of Israelis thought that the country had

achieved few if any of its goals in the war (Waxman, 2007). The war achieved less than Israelis were led to believe it would. The objective that the United States shared with Israel of destroying Hezbollah both as an end in itself and as a deterrent for Iran was not achieved. The bombastic rhetoric of Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz in the early days of the war and their vows to destroy Hezbollah fed public expectations of a decisive victory. As Hezbollah's rockets kept falling and their fighters continued to kill IDF troops, however, it became clear that such a victory would not materialize. Not only did Hezbollah continue to fight, but the Lebanese population and the Siniora government in Beirut increasingly rallied behind it. In a country long divided by sectarianism, hatred of Israel became the one issue on which the Lebanese united.

Even if the Israeli war on Hezbollah also had some positive results from the Israeli perspective and it did not defeat Hezbollah, the war did weaken it, deplete some of its arsenal, and expose its strategies and tactics. However, Israel had only itself to blame. Israel's bombing of Lebanese infrastructure and civilian buildings proved to be a serious miscalculation (Cordesman, 2006: 9). Instead of the political backlash against Hezbollah that Israel desired, the Lebanese public blamed Israel for its suffering. Israel succeeded neither in destroying Hezbollah (Cordesman, 2006: 3–6) nor in undermining Hezbollah's political standing in Lebanon, at least in the short term.

Hezbollah emerged from the war stronger than ever. Certainly, its military capabilities and infrastructure have been degraded by Israel's ferocious assault, but its political influence, not only in Lebanon but across the Arab and Muslim world, has

been enhanced. Nasrallah has become the Nasser of his day, a new pan-Arab and pan-Islamic hero (Waxman, 2007).

Most ominously for Israel, the model of 'resistance' that Hezbollah champions—violent, uncompromising, and Islamically inspired—now appears, correctly or not, to be strikingly successful and hence is likely to gain more adherents elsewhere, especially in the Palestinian territories (Waxman, 2007). Israel may have won most of the battles and inflicted heavier losses on Hezbollah, but Hezbollah undoubtedly won the propaganda war. It reaped this reward primarily because it established a very low threshold for success at the outset of the war, whereas Israel's threshold was set very high (Pan, 2006). Nasrallah defined victory for Hezbollah as survival; Olmert defined it for Israel as eliminating Hezbollah as a threat. Thus, all Hezbollah had to do to win was to survive Israel's onslaught, whereas Israel had to completely rout Hezbollah to win. By these criteria, therefore, Hezbollah won simply by not losing (Waxman, 2007).

For Israel, such a perception of loss is potentially very dangerous; more is at stake than just wounded pride. Just as the perception that Hezbollah's resistance forced Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon in May 2000 encouraged Palestinian militants to take up arms against Israel and helped foment the second Intifada, so too the perception that Hezbollah has once again defeated Israel may embolden militants, secular and Islamist alike, to step up their attacks against Israel (Waxman, 2007). Far from restoring Israeli deterrence, the war with Hezbollah may have only further eroded it. The war has dramatically exposed the vulnerability of Israel's home front to missile attacks and badly tarnished the image of the IDF, as it proved unable to defeat

a small guerrilla army, albeit a well-trained and well-armed one fighting on its own territory (Pedatzur, 2006).

If the IDF is no longer able to inspire fear in the hearts of Israel's enemies, then Israel is less able to deter these enemies, whether they are Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria, or Iran. Of course, this does not mean that Syria or Iran is now likely to launch an all-out attack against Israel, as some fear (Waxman, 2007). The traditional military balance of power is still overwhelmingly in Israel's favor, a fact of which the Syrian and Iranian regimes are surely well aware. It could mean, however, that both states will increase their support for Hezbollah and Hamas.

Although both sides were regarded to achieve significant gains that may ultimately outweigh their losses and shift the dynamics of the conflict into a stable equilibrium[3] (Gambill, 2006), the outcome of the Israel-Hezbollah war is likely to be a boon for extremists in the region. The potential growing allure of armed resistance against Israel in the wake of Hezbollah's perceived success will deal yet another blow to the attempts of Arab and Islamic moderates to promote compromise and acceptance of the Jewish state.

In the Palestinian context, it will further weaken President Mahmoud Abbas in his power struggle with the Hamas government and weaken those within Hamas who have been pushing for a change in the movement's steadfast opposition to the

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[3] Israel made concrete strategic and diplomatic gains in its decades-long quest to pacify its northern border, while failing spectacularly to achieve rather fanciful declared objectives and tarnishing its image of military invincibility. Hezbollah won a resounding political victory at home, at the expense of constrained freedom of action to fight Israelis abroad, a state-sanctioned indulgence that most Lebanese Shiites would just as soon the group give up (Gambill, 2006).

existence of Israel and a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Heller, 2006: 26).

4.4 Urgent Diplomatic Effort

July War exposed how much more vulnerable Israel is to external conventional attacks and the realization that the only inevitable solution is a political one, involving a comprehensive peace with all neighbors that may require the long-term presence of international forces on all its borders (Vincenzino, 2006). That is, the only guarantee for long term peace and stability may be increased internationalization of the peace process, particularly in terms of the security dimension.

Historians of Israel have often observed that Israel is good at winning wars but bad at winning the peace. Israel has been chronically unable to translate its stunning military accomplishments into lasting political gains, specifically peace agreements with its defeated adversaries (Waxman, 2007). The only peace agreement that Israel obtained following a war was with Egypt in 1979 after the 1973 war, which was widely considered to have been a disastrous war for Israel, notwithstanding its victory. In the case of its war with Hezbollah, the opposite may be true. For once, Israel largely failed in its military objectives but scored a diplomatic victory.

Israel's military defeat in Lebanon has created new opportunities for peace (Beilin, 2006). The Israeli government and military today are facing popular anger and strong criticism over their failures in Lebanon. Voices calling for re-launching the peace process with Abbas and Syria were countered by voices that argued that events in Gaza and Lebanon proved that there could be no peace or security based on

withdrawal and that Israel had to maintain control of the West Bank, perhaps take back parts of Gaza, and maintain its security by military force. As force seldom creates a new political environment in the contemporary Middle East (Inbar, 2007), They argued further that Syria and Iran did not favor peace and would continue to support groups in the region that would work against it, such as Hezbollah and Hamas (Salem, 2008).

The basis of Israel's diplomatic achievement is UN Security Council Resolution 1701, passed unanimously on August 12, 2006, to end the fighting. Drafted by the United States and France, the language and terms of the resolution were more favorable to Israel than to Lebanon, let alone Hezbollah. The resolution blamed Hezbollah for the outbreak of the hostilities and called for it to cease all attacks, whereas Israel only had to cease offensive military operations without defining what that meant, allowing Israel in effect to justify continued military activity in Lebanon as defensive in nature (Waxman, 2007).

After nearly three weeks of military operations, the rhetoric has shifted. The inability to achieve its original objective, the elimination of Hezbollah as a fighting force, has been substituted by a fallback: the need to prepare the ground for an international stabilization force, the creation of a buffer zone to prevent Hezbollah raids or missile attacks on northern Israel, and eventual disarmament of Hezbollah (Vincenzino, 2006). Resolution 1701 demanded the unconditional release of Israel's kidnapped soldiers, whereas no call was made for Israel to free the three Lebanese prisoners it holds. Israel was also not required to withdraw its troops immediately from southern Lebanon. Instead, they were allowed to stay until the Lebanese army

and a strengthened UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) of up to 15,000 troops were deployed to the area (Waxman, 2007).

Most importantly from Israel's perspective, Resolution 1701 called for the establishment between the international border between Israel and Lebanon and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL (Waxman, 2007). It imposed an arms embargo to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament by Syria and Iran. In essence, the resolution accepted that Hezbollah's military presence in southern Lebanon was the cause of the conflict and called for the Lebanese government to assume full control over this area with the assistance of UN peacekeepers.

Israel had been calling to no avail for the deployment of Lebanese troops to the border since its withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000. Although the Security Council issued the same demand in February 2004 in its Resolution 1559, no Lebanese government had been willing to risk a direct confrontation with Hezbollah or its Shiite constituency. Nor were they under any serious international pressure to do so, as the Bush and Chirac governments, as the sponsors of Resolution 1559 and being aware of the weakness and fragility of the Lebanese state, had preferred simply to adopt a hopeful wait-and-see approach.

What might have taken years to accomplish would now happen in days. Indeed, only five days later, on August 17, Lebanese troops began moving south of the Litani River. Having arrived in southern Lebanon for the first time in decades, the Lebanese army looks set to stay. Ironically, for a state that has long regarded the UN

with a mixture of scorn and suspicion, it was in the chambers of the UN and not on

the battlefield that Israel secured one of its central objectives (Waxman, 2007).

Resolution 1701 has made it possible to establish the new order in southern

Lebanon that Israel sought. On paper, it paves the way for the end of Hezbollah's

state within a state (Waxman, 2007). For this Resolution to deliver the decisive

change in southern Lebanon that Israelis and many Lebanese desire, its words must be

backed up by forceful actions both by the Lebanese government and the expanded

UNIFIL force. Regrettably, it is difficult not to be skeptical about the prospects for

such forceful action.

The most significant challenge in enforcing Resolution 1701 lies in bringing

about the disarmament of Hezbollah. Although Hezbollah has accepted the

deployment of Lebanese troops to the south, which it opposed before the war, it still

refuses to disarm, which is hardly surprising (Waxman, 2007). Perceiving itself as the

victor in the war, Hezbollah will not surrender now. The Siniora government remains

too weak and internally divided to confront Hezbollah over its arms. Even if it were

willing to do so, which is unlikely given the fact that two of its ministers are from

Hezbollah, it lacks the means.

Expecting the imminent disarmament of Hezbollah, as a key condition for a

new order in southern Lebanon to arise, is unrealistic. The Lebanese and UN troops

will at best be able to stabilize the tenuous cease-fire by preventing Hezbollah from

firing rockets into northern Israel and stemming the flow of Iranian and Syrian arms

to the group (Waxman, 2007). Hezbollah fighters will remain in the south, but they

will make their presence less visible by melting into the local population and hiding their weapons. This will not reassure or satisfy Israelis. It is hardly the outcome of the war they were promised by the Olmert government. Nor will it silence the government's many critics.

f Israel's diplomatic victory turns out to be a hollow one, as it may well, Olmert will be deprived of the one accomplishment of the war that he has been able to claim. This could be fatal to his already embattled premiership and even to his party (Waxman, 2007). While Israel achieved significant strategic and diplomatic goals, the war against Hezbollah was a political disaster for Olmert, who suffered the most rapid plummet of public approval ratings for an Israeli prime minister in decades (Gambill, 2006). While there is a strong public consensus in Israel that the military campaign was a failure, this is partly because of popular misconceptions about what was realistically possible to achieve (Inbar, 2007). Israel might have dealt Hezbollah a more serious blow had a different military strategy been followed, but there was never a viable prospect of preventing its regeneration once the dust settled.

4.5 Interior Conflict

Israel's 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon was rightly considered the gravest failure in Israeli military history (Glick, 2008). During and after the war, Israel sank into a strident, nationalistic atmosphere and darkness began to cover everything. The insensitivity and blindness that characterized Israeli society in recent years became then intensifying and the home front became cut in half: the north suffered and the center was serene. But both were taken over by tones of jingoism, ruthlessness and vengeance, and the voices of extremism that previously characterized the camp's

margins became then expressing its heart. In the early days of the war, Olmert and Peretz were riding high in Israeli opinion polls as the public, convinced of the war's necessity and justness, rallied behind their leadership (Waxman, 2007). A nation renowned for its fractiousness and bitter political arguments was overwhelmingly united against the Hezbollah foe.

According to a poll taken on July 17, 2006, 86 percent of the Israeli public felt the war was justified, 87 percent were satisfied with the IDF's performance in the war, and 78 percent were satisfied with the prime minister's performance. Opposition both on the left and right was unusually quiet as a palpable sense of national unity enveloped Israel's Jewish population. Its minority Arab population, on the other hand, was not part of the domestic consensus in support of the war.

The war gave Olmert an opportunity to prove his security credentials and his leadership ability, both of which were previously in doubt (Waxman, 2007). The war was also a chance for Peretz to burnish his security reputation. Weeks later, Olmert and Peretz were fighting for their political lives. Widely blamed for mismanaging the war, their popularity got plummeted in opinion polls. They faced mounting calls for their resignations, spearheaded by a protest movement of reserve soldiers who fought in the war (Hoffman, 2006; Shavit, 2006; Erlanger, 2006).

Responding to the tide of criticism, Olmert acknowledged deficiencies in his government's handling of the war and promised an examination (Myre, 2006: 1). This did little to appease his critics, who continued to demand the resignations of Olmert, Peretz, and IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, as well as the establishment of an

independent, public commission of inquiry to examine the failures of Israel's military campaign in Lebanon and with the power to dismiss government ministers (Waxman, 2007). Just months after coming into office following the March 28 general elections, the future of Olmert and his Kadima-led government is in serious jeopardy. At the time of writing, talk flourished of possible challenges to Olmert's and Peretz's leadership of the Kadima and Labor parties, respectively, and of cabinet reshuffles, new government coalitions, and early elections.

4.6 Direct Political Impacts

Although making concrete predictions is difficult, given the tumultuous nature of Israeli politics, a few things appear likely:

• Befor the early elections came about and Benjamin Netanyahu become at the top of the Israel authority, Olmert and Peretz almost certainly faced major leadership challenges from former high-ranking military and security officials, such as Shaul Mofaz in Kadima and Ehud Barak as well as Ami Ayalon in Labor. Many Israelis consider Olmert's and Peretz's lack of security experience to be one of the factors responsible for the campaign's failure. Politicians with security backgrounds will no doubt appear attractive candidates to an Israeli public that now fears a renewal of hostilities with Hezbollah and a possible military showdown with Iran over its nuclear program. One can expect a return of the generals to the top of Israel's political echelon which that really happened with the success of likud party as the extremist right symbolized by Netanyahu (Waxman, 2007).

• the early elections which came about with the Right become the major beneficiary. After being trounced in the last election, Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud

party looks set to make a major political comeback. An opinion poll have been taken befor the elections come about,that published on August 25 in Yediot Aharonot, Israel's largest daily newspaper, showed that if elections had been held then, Likud would have gained eight seats, giving it 20 compared with the 12 it won in the March election. Kadima would have lost 12 seats, reducing its total to 17 from 29; and Labor would have lost 8 seats, giving it a mere 11 seats, down from 19. The same poll gave the far-right Yisrael Beiteinu party led by Avigdor Leiberman 17 seats in an election, an increase of 6 from its current tally . the result of this poll was nearly right after the election was occurred .

• Even if Olmert or his successor Netanyahu ride out the political storm, it has already claimed one casualty: the West Bank convergence plan that was the centerpiece of Olmert government's program. This ambitious plan unveiled by Olmert in the run-up to the March 2006 election called for Israel to withdraw from large parts of the West Bank unilaterally, holding on to only the large settlement blocks and abandoning the smaller and more isolated settlements. It would involve the evacuation of 20,000–80,000 settlers (Benn and Verter, 2006). The likelihood of implementing the plan was in doubt even before the war with Hezbollah, as it faced opposition from within Olmert's own party, from the Likud party, and from the settlers themselves. Whatever its prospects before the war, after the war they vanished altogether, a fact that Olmert himself has acknowledged and became out of the political scene (Verter, 2006).

Hezbollah's launches of katyusha rockets into northern Israel from southern Lebanon and the Palestinians' launches of Qassam rockets into southern Israel from Gaza following Israel's August 2005 withdrawal starkly illustrate the risks of further

unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank, which would put most of Israel's population centers within range of Palestinian missiles which that led Israel to invade Gaza in 2008 (Waxman, 2007). Neither of the unilateral withdrawals succeeded in bringing Israelis more security; if anything, they put Israelis in greater danger. Netanyahu forcefully conveyed this view in his speech to the Knesset on the day the cease-fire in Lebanon went into effect. The policy of unilateral withdrawals has been shown to be weak and, no less important, to be perceived as weak by our enemies. Unilateral withdrawals not only eroded our deterrence, they also gave our enemies improved positions from which to shell and rocket our cities and towns.

The demise of Israel's convergence plan portends not only the end of a policy of Israeli unilateralism but also, more ominously, the end of a policy of territorial withdrawal. It is not just the unilateral nature of Israel's withdrawals but the very withdrawals themselves that are now considered to be misguided and dangerous (Waxman, 2007). The prevailing wisdom now is that not only is there nobody to talk to, there is nothing to talk about. Not only did we withdraw from Gaza and get Hamas and Qassams, we withdrew from Lebanon and got Hezbollah and rockets. The conclusion: no more withdrawals (Levy, 2006). If this prevailing public sentiment shapes the future policies of Olmert's government or his successor Netanyahu, there is little hope for the resumption of a peace process with the Palestinians, let alone negotiations with Syria, which some in Israel and the United States desire. Instead, Israel could end up turning inward and focusing all of its efforts on strengthening its defenses against its enemies—Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria, and Iran—all of whom are now perceived to be an axis of extremism bent on the destruction of the Jewish state this is from Israel perception (Waxman, 2007).

A restoration of Israel's military might and deterrence capabilities would in this scenario become Israel's top priority. Much of Israel's fierce determination and overwhelming use of power in the current conflict derives from the psychological impact of its defeat by Hezbollah and humiliating retreat from southern Lebanon in 2000 after a 22-year presence that resulted in significant casualties and ultimately produced no long-term benefits, results or advantages. Its defeat in this bloody guerrilla war of attrition tarnished Israel's reputation for military prowess and regional military supremacy established over the years after having compellingly and simultaneously defeated formidable Arab armies in '48, '67 and '73 (Vincenzino, 2006). The main danger of the unsuccessful war with Hezbollah is that the wrong conclusions will be drawn from it. The fear is that instead of exploring every possible way to reach an agreement with the Palestinians, instead of urging the international community to help us find a solution to the conflict, the solutions will be found in military training, additional force allocations, and extended military service and reserve duty, so that everyone will be well trained for every mission . as a result of this respect , Israel induce to invade Gaza in 2008 (Waxman, 2007).

4.7 Regional Alliances

If Israelis decide against future territorial withdrawals and rely solely on their military for security, they will miss a new opportunity to make peace with their neighbors (Waxman, 2007). In the bitter aftermath of a failed and costly war that seems to have only strengthened Israel's adversaries and intensified the hatred toward it across the Arab and Muslim worlds, such an opportunity may seem remote, if not illusory.

st as the war underscored the ferocious opposition of Israel's enemies, it also revealed its potential friends and allies. At the outset of the war, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia all strongly condemned Hezbollah's adventurism and unequivocally blamed it for starting the hostilities (Murphy, 2006: 1). Although these denunciations ceased as Arab public opinion became inflamed by the mounting Lebanese civilian casualties caused by Israel's aerial bombing campaign, their significance should not be dismissed (Waxman, 2007).

For the first time in an Arab-Israeli war, Arab states did not automatically publicly align themselves against Israel. Something that was once unimaginable happened: Arab leaders openly condemned aggression against Israel (Waxman, 2007). Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia were not motivated by their sympathy for Israel but by their own regional and domestic interests, basically a desire to counter the regional rise of Iran and the domestic rise of militant Islamism. These interests align with those of Israel. Israel and these moderate, Sunni-dominated Arab states all have an interest in promoting regional stability, blocking Shiite Iran's bid for regional hegemony, and stemming the rising tide of Islamist extremism. The initial reactions of the moderate Arab states to the Israel-Hezbollah war has clearly revealed that the region is now split along radical-moderate and Shiite-Sunni lines. The Arab-Israeli divide that has dominated the politics of the region for so long has now been usurped by these growing divisions.

As the fault lines in the region have shifted, Israel now has a chance to draw closer to the moderate Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. They can form a defensive alliance of sorts against their common threats, primarily Iran. Such an

alliance is the key to Israel's long-term security in the region, but it will not come without a price (Waxman, 2007). To gain admission into the new Arab moderate camp, Israel will have to make peace with the Palestinians. As long as the Palestinian issue festers, Israel cannot hope to be embraced by moderate Arab and Muslim states. Yet here too, recent events have provided an opening for a positive change.

Hamas' acceptance of the Palestinian national reconciliation document, which called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital on all the territories occupied in 1967 (Toameh, 2006), its attempt to form a national unity government, and its willingness to adhere to a cease-fire indicate a softening of its traditional hard-line position toward Israel. Its desperate need for an end to the Western aid embargo it has endured since coming to power in February 2006 gives it a strong incentive to find some kind of accommodation with Israel (Waxman, 2007).

A mutual cease-fire could pave the way. If Israelis and Palestinians were able to enjoy a period of quiet—no Qassam rockets landing in Israel and no Israeli incursions or targeted assassination in the territories—then peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, represented by Abbas, could finally resume. If a peace agreement is eventually reached, international peacekeepers could be deployed in the West Bank and Gaza to help enforce it. Now that Israel has agreed to such troops in southern Lebanon, it may drop its longtime objection to the deployment of UN peacekeepers in the territories, depending of course on how UNIFIL performs (Waxman, 2007).

A renewal of Israeli-Syrian indirect peace negotiations, which abruptly ended with the failure of the last round of negotiations convened by the Clinton administration in 2000, is now also possible particularly which mediated by Turkey ,that abruptly postpone by the invasion of Gaza in 2008 , (Waxman, 2007). Israel's inability to destroy Hezbollah militarily has led many to argue that the only solution to dealing with Hezbollah's continuing threat lies with Syria. Shortly after the cease-fire agreement with Hezbollah went into effect, a number of Israeli officials and commentators suggested a resumption of talks with Syria, most prominently Peretz, although he later backtracked after Olmert shot down the idea (Benn and Mualem, 2006).

Syria is the key to neutralizing Hezbollah. It may not simply control Hezbollah, but its supply of weapons and its role as a transit route for Iranian arms is critical to the group's military capability. Without Syrian or Iranian weapons reaching it via Syria, Hezbollah will not be able to easily rearm, and its military potential will be severely degraded (Waxman, 2007).Pressure alone is unlikely to persuade Syria to end its longtime support for Hezbollah. As long as Israel occupies the Golan Heights, which it captured from Syria in the 1967 war, Syria will continue to support Hezbollah as one of its few means of leverage against Israel.

Because Syria's alliance with Hezbollah is purely instrumental, however, it would most likely be willing to end its support for Hezbollah as well as other resistant groups, most notably Hamas and Islamic Jihad, both of which have offices in Damascus, in return for the Golan Heights. An Israeli-Syrian peace agreement could also help pry Syria away from its alliance of convenience with Iran, reportedly a Bush

administration idea to isolate Iran (Cooper and Sanger, 2006). Once Israel makes peace with Syria, it could also make peace with Lebanon. The key issue of the disputed Shebaa Farms—occupied by Israel, claimed by Lebanon, but formally Syrian territory—cannot be resolved if Syria does not renounce its sovereignty over the area. If it is still being shunned by United State and Israel, Syria will not likely play a constructive role in this respect (Waxman, 2007)

4.8 Further Reading

With Israeli expectations being set high, the mixed result of the summer war was perceived as a loss (Salem, 2008) and then Israel now stands at a crossroads. As a weary and wounded nation coming to terms with deflated expectations from its war with Hezbollah, the country can concentrate on strengthening the IDF in the hopes that next time it can deliver a decisive victory or it can unite with moderate Arab states and leaders through peace agreements. The debate over these two choices is already underway in Israel, with the former option currently enjoying more public and political support, but its outcome will be decided by the fears and wishes of Israelis as well as by signals sent from Washington (Waxman, 2007).

The war on Lebanon was fought primarily as an effort to advance America's hegemonic objectives in the Middle East rather than as a defense of Israel's legitimate security interests is made more apparent by how damaging the war was to Israel's political and strategic interests (Zunes, 2007). As Israel's closest ally, the United States maintains a powerful influence on Israeli public opinion and on the policies of Israeli governments. If it wishes, Washington can now use this influence to encourage Israel to return to the negotiating table with the Palestinians and Syrians (Waxman,

2007), particularly after Israelis began to recognize how deleterious the war was to Israel's legitimate security interests and a growing awareness emerged of the American role in getting them into that mess.

Instead of trying to isolate the Hamas government and Assad regime, the United States administration could begin to engage both and prod Israel to do the same which that adopted by Bush administration and his successor Obama . It could go even further by launching a regional initiative aimed at resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, using as a basis the 2002 Saudi peace plan that offered Israel full peace and normalized relations with all 22 Arab states in return for solving the Palestinian problem, and by establishing a new security forum in which Israel and moderate Arab states could address their common security threats, including Iran, Islamic extremism, and jihadism (Ignatius, 2006: 13).

July War will probably prove to be one episode within a longer confrontation involving international and regional powers. It might be most closely linked with potential conflict with Iran over the nuclear issue, but it could also prove to be a critical station within an ongoing recalibration of power between Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United States and other powers active in the Middle East (Salem, 2008). Hezbollah's robust performance during the war surprised Israeli and American military experts, and certainly made them think twice about the ease and cost of any military strike against Iran. On the other hand, it gave them insight into what such a confrontation might be like, and gave them an opportunity to prepare more effectively for such an eventuality. On balance, the summer war reduced Hezbollah's capacity to

act as a proxy deterrent for Iran and gave Israel and/or the US—despite Israel's poor performance—some valuable insight and information (Salem, 2008).

At the end, the region will continue to be in political limbo and all of us will continue to pay the price, including those who believe in Tel Aviv and Washington that brute force will advance their political views and visions for the future of this region. Israeli foreign policy was accused of weakness on a variety of fronts: (1) policy failed to foresee the occurrence of imminent events; (2) policy failed to prevent outcomes that, in hindsight, were avoidable; and (3) policy failed to anticipate the costs of preventable occurrences (Joseph and Carment, 2000).

The remarkable success of the Zionist movement owes much to realism, as it is more commonly known in its American incarnation. There is more to the story of Israeli politics than realism. Some of the most effective aspects of Israeli foreign policy flatly contradict the tenets of pragmatism, in comparison with Hizbollah's pragmatism that should not be mistaken for genuine acceptance of Lebanon's confessional system and the constraints that come with it (Hokayem, 2007). To rehabilitate a shattered people and build a state required hefty doses of ideological romanticism, heroic mythology, benign illusion, and rhetorical hyperbole (i.e. unrealism). It is this sometimes precarious balance of realism and unrealism that makes Israeli foreign policy unique. To understand the nature of this balance, it is necessary to review the distracting nature of Israeli realist rhetoric as well as examine the core of Zionist unrealism lying beneath it (Cohen, 1994).

Israel's attitude toward the use of force departs most markedly from the realist heritage. In the classic tradition, force is a legitimate extension of political action. But

it is also a costly expedient to be used only in the absence of better alternatives. For people that were long deprived of conventional tools of state power, however, armed force has a deeper significance (Harkabi, 1983). Should Israeli officials recognize their mistakes, however, they will find much with which to restore unquestioned Israeli regional deterrence. It can not be ignored that the war demonstrated that Israel is a strong state, it has the spirit to fight, and the Israeli home front displayed some resilience (Inbar, 2007). With adequate preparation, Tel Aviv might attain a clear victory in the next round, which, however unfortunate, the outcome of the 2006 war makes inevitable ,but in 2008 by the invasion of Gaza Israel committee the same errors and miss of calculations and depend on the power alternative not on the political one .

4.9 Summary

This Chapter presents the impacts of the July War on Israel's foreign policy, as Israel was defeated in the War. Various aspects in this regard are explained herein, which are the military escalation between the two parties, Israel's mission outcomes, urgent diplomatic effort, interior conflict and direct political impacts and lastly the regional alliances which Israel enjoyed after the War.

V

CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary

This study has discussed generally the importance of military power and foreign policy in international relations and particularly the Israeli military-then-political position after its defeat in the July War 2006. Within the matter of assessing the implications of the July War 2006 on Israel's foreign policy, the study aimed at highlighting the relation between military power and foreign policy; identifying the reasons that stood behind the July War 2006; and analyzing the July war's impact on Israel's foreign policy.

A descriptive approach of analysis has been used as well through examining historically the roots of the conflict and concentrating on the 33 days of the war from 12 July 2006 to 14 August 2006 and the impact of the war on Israel's foreign policy. Military power is generally known as the main pillar in strategic studies to attain certain political ends, whether by the actual use of force or by threatening or deterring others, which reflect the themes of the Realism School. Foreign policy on the other side is known as the interaction, which concerns itself with shaping the relations between a certain state on the on hand and certain other entities on the other hand in order to achieve its national interests, regardless of what sort of power that will be used by that state toward the other entities.

The July war 2006 was almost a result of the US failure to establish a new (or great) Middle East region and to transform Lebanon from a state to reject to a state to

accept the US role and new project. The study has examined the beginning of the conflict, Hezbollah action, and Israeli action, position of Lebanon, allegations and war crime reports, casualties, international action and reaction, and ceasefire and reviews of the conflict along with many other considerations of the War.

It has been found that military power is the key instrument to achieve political ends and to defend the Israel's foreign policy ; distrust and deterrence are the most dominant factors when drawing military policies in Israel, so it seeks to sophisticate its military capabilities to face any expected military attack; the Israeli military and political leaderships failed in achieving their goals, whereas the Islamic resistance achieved its, as in cutting the arm of the Israeli deterrence policy; and some changes occurred in Israel's foreign policy after the July War 2006.

5.2 Main Findings

Throughout its attempt to describe what an association between military power and foreign policy exists, the warlike conflict between Israeli and Hezbollah and the impacts of the July war on Israeli foreign policy, the present study has reached the following main findings or generalizations:

▪ As the application of military power to meet vital national objectives, a state's power has certain strategies. These include a wide range of measures geared toward coercing or threatening other entities into compliance.

▪ Regarding Israel's military power as the main instrument in shaping and defending its foreign policy, the Israeli interests require to be attained building up a

strong army, which should be equipped with high technology and armament, including nuclear weapons as a deterrence power.

- Military power is the main and crucial instrument of foreign policy. The relationship between military power and foreign policy is interrelated and mostly depends on how much strong a state's military power is and how much this power can affect others and achieve its interests.

- A war of no choice is a defensive war that is forced on Israel, thereby absolving the country and its leadership of any moral responsibility for its outbreak and the subsequent deaths incurred on each side.

- Israel's military escalation was a response to a perceived weakness and growing danger: the steady erosion of Israeli deterrence.

- Beyond the actual results of the summer war, many Israelis were concerned that the war objectives were not accomplished and the relative Israeli defeat by Hezbollah had dangerous general effects.

- The results of Israel's war with Hezbollah appear to have fallen short of Israel's ambitious objectives.

- Even if the Israeli war on Hezbollah also had some positive results from the Israeli perspective and it did not defeat Hezbollah, the war did weaken it, deplete some of its arsenal, and expose its strategies and tactics.

- Hezbollah emerged from the war stronger than ever in spite of its military capabilities and infrastructure have been degraded by Israel's ferocious assault, but its political influence, not only in Lebanon but across the Arab and Muslim world, has been enhanced.

- The July War exposed how much more vulnerable Israel is to external conventional attacks and the realization that the only inevitable solution is a political one, involving a comprehensive peace with all neighbors that may require the long-term presence of international forces on all its borders.

- Israel's 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon was rightly considered the gravest failure in Israeli military history. During and after the war, Israel sank into a strident, nationalistic atmosphere and darkness began to cover everything.

- If Israelis decide against future territorial withdrawals and rely solely on their military for security, they will miss a new opportunity to make peace with their neighbors.

- With Israeli expectations being set high, the mixed result of the summer war was perceived as a loss and then Israel now stands at a crossroads.

- The war on Lebanon was fought primarily as an effort to advance America's hegemonic objectives in the Middle East rather than as a defense of Israel's legitimate

security interests is made more apparent by how damaging the war was to Israel's political and strategic interests.

▪ Syria's alliance with Hezbollah is purely instrumental in the status que thus it will not play a constructive role unless Jolene heights return back and find a solution for Sheba farms .

▪ There is little hope for the resumption of peace process with Palestinians and renewal of indirect negotiation with Syria meditated by Turky .

▪ Israel's attitude toward the use of force departs most markedly from the realist heritage.

5.3. Recommendations

Based on the above-stated generalizations, the present study would recommend the following to be taken into account for the decision makers and for any future research in this diverse field of the association between military power and foreign policy in general and the impacts of the July War on Israeli's foreign policy in particular:

• The inevitable solution for Israel to maintain its security is apolitical alternative not a military one , that proved by SCR 1701 which have been cooked in UN chambers not in the battle field and Israel itself consider it as the best accomplishment in the war , and the military power seldom creates anew political environment in the contemporary Middle East .

• Delaying the peace process harmful for all the middle east nations included Israel and should take apolitical track with soft power approach .

• The solely decision that could be taken by any Arab state or entity lead to weakness and more Arab unity division and to effective the combination Arab market as the model which that happened to the European countries before its union .

- Israel depend on the international and western role to achieve it's interest and to sustain its security **,**which that clearly appeared in the drafting the SCR 1701 by USA and Franc

- The only guarantee for the long peace and stability in the region with all Israel,s borders is spreading international forces and internationalization the peace process and its outcome .

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تقييم انعكاسات حرب تموز 2006 على السياسة الخارجية الإسرائيلية
دراسة حالة
(حرب تموز 2006 بين إسرائيل وحزب الله)

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الملخص

تهدف هذه الرسالة إلى بيان العلاقة بين القوة العسكرية والسياسة الخارجية ولتعريف بالأسباب التي تقف وراء حرب تموز 2006 وتحليل تأثير الحرب على السياسة الخارجية الإسرائيلية. لقد تبنت الرسالة المنهج التحليلي الوصفي في إعدادها من خلال خمسة فــصول , المقدمــة, الإطار النظري , مشهد الحرب , تأثير الحرب على السياسة الخارجية الإسرائيلية .

يشمل الفصل الأول المقدمة , الفصل الثاني يناقش مفهوم وعلاقة القوة العسكرية بالــسياسة الخارجية من خلال تعريف القوة العسكرية وتعريف السياسة الخارجية وشرح المــصطلحات ذات العلاقة مثل أنواع القوة التي تمتلكها الدول والدبلوماسية التعاونية والدبلوماسية المذعنــة, الفصل الثالث يصف الصراع بين حزب الله وإسرائيل من البداية مرورا بأحداث ومجربــات الحرب وفعل كل من الطرفين حتى وقف إطلاق النار ورد الفعل داخل إســرائيل ولبنــان , وتأثير الحرب على السياسة الإسرائيلية ولبيان الخسائر البشرية والمادية لكل مــن الطــرفين بالإضافة إلى مفارقات الصحافة , الفصل الرابع عرض تأثير حرب تموز علــى الــسياسة الخارجية الإسرائيلية على ضوء هزيمة إسرائيل مع التعرض لــبعض المفاهيم العــسكرية والسياسية والجهود الدبلوماسية والصراع الداخلي الإسرائيلي وصولا إلى التــأثير المباشــر للحرب على السياسة الخارجية الإسرائيلية والتحالفات في المنطقة .

ومن خلال منظور فرضي وإجابة على الأسئلة المقترحة فان الرسالة قــد وجــدت إن القــوة العسكرية هي الادأه الفعالة لانجاز الأهداف السياسية والــدفاع عــن الــسياسة الخارجيــة الإسرائيلية وبالتناوب فان فشل إسرائيل العسكري الذي حدا بها إلى إعادة النظر وتغيير فــي سياستها الخارجية بالاتجاه نحو المسار الدبلوماسي والى عدم الاعتماد على القوة العــسكرية فقط .